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Abstract
This thesis deals with the establishemnt of the rubber plantation Varanasi in
the Bousraa village complex, Mondulkiri Province, Cambodia. The land that the
project is changing from forest to plantation has been used by the Bunong, an
indigenous group practicing swidden agriculture, for generations. The establishment
of the plantation has led to protests, sabotage actions, the generation of difference
in the community and the dispossession of villagers, all in the name of “economic
development”. The central argument is that by applying the moral economy concept
to the Bunong, their relationship to land can be seen as complex and “total”,
while the idea behind the plantation is to tap an untapped set of resources for
commodity production - a purely profit-oriented outlook. This leads to the concept
of “development” losing all meaning in context of the case: it becomes obvious that
a rethinking of what development is and should be is necessary.
iii

Acknowledgements:
Several people deserve thanks for their help with this study.
First of all, Associate Professor Lorenzo Can˜a´s Bottos at the Social Anthropology de-
partment, NTNU, has provided much valuable feedback, suggestions and a wealth of
literature for me to explore. Any misconception or error left in the text is, of course,
entirely my own.
In Cambodia I would like to thank, first and foremost, the people in Bousraa, who
generously shared their lives, thoughts and time with me, something which must have
occsionally have been frustrating and demanding on their patience. I hope I have done
you justice in my presentation. Furthermore, Torn and Thet, two very good friends, de-
serve mention here, as their friendship and interest have played a key role in my interest
in their native country. Thank you!
Brigitte Nikles and Fre´de´ric Bourdier have provided valuable insights, have taken the
time to discuss issues of mutual interest, and have helped in finding informants, literature
and colleagues, as well as writing several of the texts that are much quoted in this thesis.
I hope you find this thesis can contribute in some small way to the body of work you are
creating.
Tom Windelinckx, Jack Highwood and Samuel Bartholin deserve a special mention for
listening to my (often incoherent) ramblings, for sharing meals and drinks, and for being
great friends. Let’s hope we meet again soon.
v

Contents
1 Frameworks 1
1.1 Introduction . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3
1.2 Moral Economy, Development and Resistance . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 5
1.3 Places . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 21
1.4 Brief Introduction to Ethnic Minorities in Cambodia; the Bunong . . . . . 24
1.5 Methodology . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 25
1.6 Onwards . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 27
2 Moral Economy 29
2.1 Land as Object of Production . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 30
2.2 Land as Spiritual Good . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 37
2.3 Land as Social Good . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 43
2.4 Moral Economy and the Bunong . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 45
3 Development 49
3.1 Development in Cambodia: Capitalist State Formation? . . . . . . . . . . 50
3.2 The Case at Hand: Socfin KCD in Bousraa . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 53
3.3 Villagers on Development . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 63
3.4 ”Development” and the Bunong . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 68
4 Resistance 73
4.1 Public and Hidden Transcripts . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 74
4.2 Violations and Consequences . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 82
4.3 Sabotage, Curses, Slander and Revolt . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 84
4.4 Resistance and the Bunong . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 86
5 Conclusions 89
5.1 In Conclusion: Moral Economy, Development and Resistance . . . . . . . . 90
5.2 In Conclusion: Thoughts on Evasion, Inclusion and State Formation . . . . 93
References 95
vii

1 Frameworks
“Mankind has opted for monoculture; it is in the process of creating a mass
civilization, as beetroot is grown in the mass. Henceforth, man’s daily bill of
fare will consist only of this one item” Claude Le´vi-Strauss, Tristes Tropiques,
1955.
Figure 1: View from a height in Bousraa, facing west.
Figure 2: Cadastral map of concessions in the Bousraa area. Image taken from FIDH
(2011).
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“Protection of indigenous peoples’ land rights is still, however, vastly inad-
equate ... Land grabbing involving indigenous land continues. Large-scale
developments continue to have devastating impacts on indigenous peoples;
these include the development of plantations and tourist sites, mining and the
construction of hydroelectric dams and roads. There has been essentially no
meaningful consultation of indigenous peoples during project decision-making
and no free, prior, and informed consent given ... Over the last decade, the
Cambodian government has granted large numbers of economic land conces-
sions for rubber, pine trees, corn and other plantations in indigenous areas.
A 2007 UN report found that “the alienation of indigenous land through the
grant of concessions is undermining the ability of indigenous communities to
register their collective ownership of traditional lands, and enforce their rights
to land under the Land Law”. Indigenous communities have lost forests (in-
cluding sacred forests), other sacred sites, agricultural land, residential land
and other land ... The government has made it clear that it considers tree
plantations to be forests, so forests can be converted to plantations without
changing official measures of forest cover.” (Wessendorf 2011:297-298)
“Standing in the middle of the plantation seemed almost surreal. There was
absolutely nothing left. Some patches of forest were left here and there, but
the bulldozers were actively working to flatten them. We were stopped by
an extremely unfriendly Frenchman1(presumably), yelling, telling us not to
take photos. Five years ago I got lost here trying to find Phnom Nam Lia2 -
the forest was so dense we couldn’t see it, we decided we’d need a GPS and
coordinates. Now it sits on the horizon, with a wide, graded dirt road leading
right up to the base. Everywhere there were tree trunks, seemingly just tossed
aside, worthless. Some areas had rubber saplings planted, others had not been
planted yet. As we drove onwards to the river by the base of the mountain,
1One of the SOCFIN KCD employees. He was presumably laid off sometime after my fieldwork, when
most of the western staff was replaced. He was noted by several of my informants as being “fat and rude”
- I’ll let this stand as their words.
2Phnom Nam Lia / Nam Lear / Namlyr etc. is a black volcanic mountain situated in what was once
the forests east of Bousraa. It holds spiritual significance for the Bunong as part of their myth of creation,
and is considered a holy place.
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the sheer size of the project dawned on me. This is a quarter. A quarter of
one concession. There won’t be anything left at all.” (Field notes, February
2010)
1.1 Introduction
The first quote above paints a bleak picture of the rights of indigenous peoples in Cambo-
dia. Under the guise of “development”, massive financial projects are being implemented
on indigenous lands, lands which the communities that utilize it have limited means of se-
curing tenure rights to. This thesis deals primarily with one such case, the implementation
of the rubber plantation “Varanasi” on the land of the Bunong in Mondulkiri province,
Cambodia. The plantation is a joint venture between Luxembourg-registered rubber giant
Socfinal and Cambodian entrepreneur firm Khau Chuly, collaborating as Socfin KCD3.
The concession was granted by the Cambodian government (FIDH 2011). The quote from
my field notes is meant to illustrate the scope of the operation. At the time of fieldwork,
approximately one third of the total area granted (2600/6978 ha.) had been cleared and
was being prepared for planting. Bousraa village, where I undertook my fieldwork, is the
closest settlement to the plantation area, and is mainly populated by individuals from the
Bunong indigenous group. The Bunong have traditionally practiced swidden agriculture
(also called “rotational” or “slash-and-burn” agriculture) for subsistence, in addition to
gathering non-timber forest products4 from the forests surrounding their villages, fishing
and hunting. With their means for subsistence eroding fast, the Bunong are forced into
wage labor at the plantation, with no security net in the form of self-production of food,
and no forest in the immediate vicinity to forage for other goods in. This has led to a
varied set of reactions to the situation by the original population of Bousraa. This thesis
aims to identify and analyze these reactions, and to contextualize them to a larger frame-
work of peasant analysis, development rhetoric and resistance movements.
In this thesis I utilize the concept of moral economy to analyze the situation in Bousraa,
as shared notions of right and wrong have surfaced in the community, and the population
3Socfin is a subsidiary of Luxembourg-registered Socfinal, a company with links to rubber plantations
in Africa. KCD is short for Khau Chuly Development, a Cambodian entrepreneurial firm.
4Abb.: NTFP. This includes, but is not limited to: resin from trees (used as trade goods), honey,
medicinal plants and herbs, animals etc. (Nikles 2006).
3
on one occasion rose against the rubber companies in a massive protest, burning tractors
and threatening employees. The application of the moral economy concept facilitates the
analysis of the reactions to the establishment of the plantation, as it grounds the Bunong’s
worldview in a set of values that are radically different from those of a multinational cor-
poration. The concept of moral economy is furthered by introducing land as a social good
upon which the Bunong base their conception of justice, linking this to their animist be-
liefs - losing access to land means losing access to sacred places and to the blessing of the
spirits that inhabit nature. This renders them unable to appease the spirits that ensure
their well-being, leaving them bankrupt not just in the economical (financial) sense, but
also in a moral sense.
Further, the thesis argues that in the light of the moral economy, a rethinking of what is
being presented as development is necessary. The rhetoric involved in these large-scale op-
erations is examined, showing them as templates of an already predefined “development”
that is an export from the north, and that does not necessarily take local conditions
into account, as, indeed, this justification is not needed. The thesis argues that if any
meaningful “development” is to take place, it is absolutely essential that the communi-
ties affected by such projects are included in the planning and decision-making of these
projects, or there can not be development, only the removal of basic rights and privileges,
and, perhaps most importantly, there can be no choice or control over one’s own future.
This argument is tied closely to that of the Cambodian government’s handling of the
issues concerning indigenous land.
Finally, the thesis looks into resistance as a product of the moral economy clashing with
development projects. The Bunong of Bousraa employ various strategies of resistance to
what they see as unfair treatment. The effectiveness can be debated, but the existence
of such patterns confirm the concept of moral economy as relevant to the situation in
Bousraa, and gives insight into motivation and ideals for a meaningful development. Re-
sistance, then, becomes a product of basic violations of what is perceived as (and indeed,
legally is) right, not the result of the “backwardness” of indigenous communities, as it is
often presented in the developmental discourse.
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1.2 Moral Economy, Development and Resistance
The term “moral economy” stems from the work of E. P. Thompson (1963, 1971). Thomp-
son deals with the “bread riots” of eighteenth century Britain - a situation where peasants
and workers faced dramatically increased food prices over a short period of time, all the
while being forced to pay the same taxes and rents, and thus having their basis for sub-
sistence endangered (Thompson 1963). Thompson sees the reaction to this (the “bread
riots”) not as some spur-of-the-moment, anger-driven violent outburst, but rather as an
indicator of a deeper sense of justice and injustice within the “English working class”:
“It rested upon more articulate popular sanctions and was validated by more
sophisticated traditions than the word “riot” suggests. The most common
example is the bread or food riot, repeated cases of which can be found in
almost every town and county until the 1840s. This was rarely a mere uproar
which culminated in the breaking open of barns or the looting of shops. It
was legitimized by the assumptions of an older moral economy, which taught
the immorality of any unfair method of forcing up the price of provisions by
profiteering upon the necessities of the people.” (Thompson 1963:62-63)
Moral economy, then, is in direct opposition to the liberal idea of the “free market”, as
the free market is the idea which enables this “profiteering upon the necessities of the
people”. The moral economy, being a measure for justice and injustice, legitimizes protest
through a common notion in the society, group or class about right and wrong, because:
“...behind every such form of popular direct action some legitimizing notion of right is to
be found” (Thompson 1963:68).
Thompson furthers the idea of the moral economy to encompass that the bread riot-
ers were legitimizing their actions upon “...the belief that they were defending traditional
rights or customs; and, in general, that they were supported by the wider consensus of
the community” (Thompson 1971:188). With this expansion of the concept in mind, the
moral economy can be seen as the internal “scale” upon which interactions with the mar-
ket or, in Thompson’s terminology, the “political economy” are weighed. If the scales tip
too far (i. e. traditional rights and/or customs are being challenged), the internal sense
of injustice will trigger counteraction to the problem at hand, in this case taking the form
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of riots. This entails that the two economies have different “regimes of value” (Humphrey
& Hugh-Jones 1992): the value put on tradition on the one hand and value as price in a
market situation on the other. This means that the concept of moral economy can be used
not only to interpret the actions of individuals involved in this form of rioting based on the
conflict between the market and an internal sense of justice or challenge to tradition, but
can also be used, on the flip-side, to explain the nature and timing of such riots or protests.
The theory of moral economy is picked up and greatly expanded upon by James C.
Scott in The Moral Economy of the Peasant (1976). Scott transfers Thompson’s as-
sumptions about the English working class to Southeast Asian peasants, and introduces
additional concepts for analyzing and understanding peasant behavior. Just as Thompson
(or, perhaps more accurately, because of Thompson), he looks to peasant rebellions for
his empirical data. He explains his central concept:
“We can learn a great deal from rebels who were defeated nearly a half-century
ago. If we understand the indignation and rage which prompted them to risk
everything, we can grasp what I have chosen to call their moral economy: their
notion of economic justice and their working definition of exploitation - their
view of which claims on their product were tolerable and which intolerable.
Insofar as their moral economy is representative of peasants elsewhere, and I
believe I can show that it is, we may move toward a fuller appreciation of the
normative roots of peasant politics.” (Scott 1976:3-4)
Once again we see the concept of justice as the central point around which the framework
is spun. Scott relates his analysis to groups of people who in the larger scheme of things
have tried to evade state formation and taxation (2009), which relates directly to “their
view of which claims on their product were tolerable and which intolerable” (Scott 1976:3).
The general idea that Scott puts forward is that peasants operate within a “safety first”
framework for subsistence, which has its own set of decision-making processes aimed at
securing a minimum, or a subsistence basis, for all members of the community (Scott
1976:5). This is what he puts forward as the peasant’s “subsistence ethic” - which is the
general term for what his ideas mean for the analysis of peasant economics, morality and
politics.
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Thompson’s (1963;1971) framework for analysis is built upon these three central themes:
economics, morality and politics. This is picked up by Scott, and transferred to the realm
of Southeast Asian peasants. On the issue of economics, the “safety first”-principle comes
into play. Scott asserts that because of the nature of subsistence farming, any farmer will
be averse to taking risks, as what he would be risking would be the subsistence basis of
himself, his family, in some cases even of his group (Scott 1976:17-19). The potential gain
involved in changing, for instance, the type of rice sown or the equipment used to sow and
nurture it, will in most cases not outplay the risk involved for the subsistence basis of the
family should one of these schemes fail dramatically (Scott 1976:19). It should be noted,
though, that subsistence farmers cannot be seen as absolutely averse to taking risks: if
the risk is low enough not to challenge subsistence safety, and the potential gain is seen
as high enough, peasants will attempt innovation (Scott 1976:24). Generally speaking,
the closer a farmer is to subsistence minimum in terms of agricultural output, the more
averse he is to taking risks. He also notes that the argument only holds as long as the
farmer is operating close enough to the subsistence security “limit”: if there are enough
resources to ensure subsistence even if some things fail (i. e. a farmer has three plots of
land, but is only dependent on one to ensure subsistence), the argument would not hold
(Scott 1976:25). In these cases, as well as cases where the traditional subsistence safety
is threatened, innovation increases in bouts of either attempting surplus/profit or as a
“last attempt” to secure a threatened subsistence (Scott 1976:26). Furthermore, there is
the aspect of risk management. As a subsistence farmer is always the prey of the forces
of nature, the subsistence minimum will not always be met, something which the farmer
tries to avoid by having diverse plots of land with diverse crops (i. e. to prevent all his
resources from being washed away in a flood or destroyed by drought). If this strategy
fails, however, there are several mechanisms present in the society to act as so-called
“insurances” against starvation (Scott 1976:27). These become an integral part of how
peasant economics work, as the economy then revolves around relations of reciprocity
rather than those of trade.
Moving on to morality, we can better understand how morality becomes an integral part
of the subsistence ethic by looking at the “subsistence claim” (Scott 1976:32). This
claim overlaps with that of Thompson’s “English crowd”, and Scott formulates it: “...
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any claim on peasants by elites or the state could have no justice when it infringed on
subsistence needs” (Scott 1976:33). This means, then, that a peasant community will
occasionally “throw caution to the wind” and perform acts that would otherwise be con-
ceived as morally wrong, should the subsistence basis be threatened by external factors.
This reflects the idea of justice put forward above: the community has its claims on the
population (in the form of those peasants that are more well-off being, on occasion, re-
quired to help those less fortunate), but all members of the community also has a justified
claim to subsistence. If these mechanics are disrupted in a manner that is seen as unfair
or unjust, the community will react.
Scott terms the ways of exchange in subsistence communities as relations of reciprocity or
equal exchange (1976:172). In the subsistence claim lies the idea that as all members of the
community are entitled to subsistence, those in the community that are more well-off than
others are expected to help those less fortunate, in exchange for services such as labor.
This mechanic is possible in a community where the producers and the consumers are the
same group - the output of agriculture is produced to satisfy local nutritional needs, not to
generate surplus and profit. In this we can see a contrast to the market economies, where
producer and consumer are two different links in the production-consumption chain, that
have a relationship mediated by money. Appandurai (1986) says the following on the
distinction between reciprocity and the circulation of commodities:
“Gifts, and the spirit of reciprocity, sociability and spontaneity in which they
are typically exchanged, usually are starkly opposed to the profit-oriented,
self-centered and calculated spirit that fires the circulation of commodities.
Further, where gifts link things to persons and embed the flow of things in the
flow of social relations, commodities are held to represent the drive - largely
free of moral or cultural constraints - of goods for one another, a drive mediated
by money, not by sociality” (Appandurai 1986:81)
While the subsistence communities are most certainly “driven” by sociality and equal
exchange that depends upon this sociality, the market is largely disconnected from these
relations. The contrast thus becomes clear: the fundamental economics of the market are
in conflict with the morally based economics of reciprocity and equal exchange, and are
in direct opposition to the ideals of securing subsistence rather than maximizing profits.
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When it comes to peasant politics, Scott relies heavily on theories of patron-client-
relationships to explain how inequalities in the community are seen as either of equal
(or roughly equal) exchange, or as instruments of exploitation (Scott 1976:170-171). Wolf
defines these client-patron relations as “imbalanced friendships” (1966:16):
“When instrumental friendship reaches a maximum point of imbalance so that
one partner is clearly superior to the other in his capacity to grant goods and
services, we approach the critical point where friendships give way to the
patron-client tie.”
While peasants that are in the same situation will be able to help each other out on a
favor-for-favor basis, the peasants that are comparatively well-off are expected to con-
tribute to those that are not, and in return for this favor they get loyalty, and, per the
reciprocity principle, favors in return, even if these are favors of a different nature (such
as labor, “goodwill” etc.) (Scott 1976:170, Wolf 1966:17). This again invokes the sense
of justice in the community: is the exchange fair? And again: if the exchange is not fair,
will the community stand for it (in the event that a client-patron relationship is formed)?
This means that the politics of subsistence are formed on the basis of reciprocity and
fair exchange, all tied into the morality of the subsistence claim and the economy of the
“safety first”-principle.
So, the subsistence ethic combined with the application of low-risk, low-yield agriculture
then becomes a model for explaining peasant motivation and agency. Scott’s argument is
that agent-centered theories of risk-taking and innovation are too narrow, and that there
is more complexity to peasant economy than agent-theories suggest. The shared social
norms, the notion of justice in social relationships, and the shared outrage when injustice
occurs indicates that there is a framework based upon the moral economy concepts that
can be generalized (Scott 1976, Moise 1982).
Scott’s model was criticized, in particular by Samuel Popkin (1979), mainly for being
too romantic in regards to the past, and for not seeing the benefits of modernization on
peasant societies (Popkin 1979:ix). This notion was refuted by Edwin E. Moise (1982).
claiming that Popkin completely misrepresents the views of moral economists, and that
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his reading of Scott is inaccurate at best and erroneous at worst (Moise 1982:72). The
criticisms and defenses of the moral economy as an analytical tool are many - too many
to take into account here. I will bring two more articles to the table here, both of them
arguing that the moral economy is a viable theory, but also that it has shortcomings and
needs some improvements to be able to handle the diversity of the situations it attempts
to explain and analyze.
Furthering the ideas of both Scott and Popkin, Pierre Brocheux’ article (1983) is based
on empirical material utilized by both Scott and Popkin in their respective works, namely
Vietnamese peasants and the revolts of the 1930s (Brocheux 1983). On the topic of the
relationship to the “past” (as romanticized ideal) and the “future” (another romanticized
ideal of market economy), Brocheux argues, put simply, that the division is not that clear:
“We can observe simultaneous, uneven thrusts toward both the defense and
rejection of the structures and values of the past. Because of this rejection,
revolutionary Marxism penetrated Vietnam. This reminds us that the social
movements discussed by Scott and Popkin are complex, ambiguous and con-
tradictory, which should not be ignored when they are used for theoretical
purposes. Moreover, if we do not take into account the narrow link between
the social and the political spheres, we run the risk of missing the originality
of the peasant movements.” (Brocheux 1983:798)
Brocheux’s arguing point with both Scott and Popkin is that they “... lost sight of
the interrelationship between villages and the rest of the society and its institutions”
(Brocheux 1983:799). It is, then, not as simple as “peasants joining the communist party
because the patron-client relations were being seen as unfair” (Popkin), or “peasants re-
volting because their values were being intruded upon” (Scott). Brocheux illustrates the
relationship between the moral and the political economy by seeing the social contract
between peasant and state in communist ideology as a “new” moral economy (one where
reciprocal relations are taken into consideration), and the state and the collectives as the
“architects of the political economy” - and he points out that the reconciliation of the
two is difficult, if not impossible, as peasants are allowed their traditional ways, yet the
state seeks to increase productivity (Brocheux 1983:801). The concluding thought is that
the separation between political and moral economies is only a theoretical one - the fuller
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picture includes them both (Brocheux 1983:802). This means, then, that any empirical
data that is used in context with the idea of the moral economy should focus not only
on the social mechanics within the group in question, but also on their relations to the
political economy of the state.
The last article that will be used for the moral economy framework in this context, is
Thomas Clay Arnold (2001). Arnold argues for a theory of moral economy based on
social goods, as this will allow broader generalizations of the concept, thus allowing for
more open fields for applying the theory (Arnold 2001:94). He makes the claims that the
distinction between market and non-market societies is too central to the debate, that
the claim that “economic incorporation of a non-market people is the basis for the moral
indignation that leads to rebellion and resistance” is too narrow, and that reshaping the
theory to revolve around social goods broadens the scope of the moral economy, as it
opens up to other forms of moral indignation than simply that of the intrusion of the
market in a non-market context (Arnold 2001:85). His empirical case is that of water
politics in the American West, and he shows that policies affecting water, being a moral
concept for western states and cities, can ignite the same feelings of communal injustice
as showed in Scott’s work. Access to specific social goods thus play a part when trying
to find the source of the moral indignation in a community. The relevance of this point
will be shown in the empirical data of this thesis, albeit regarding different social goods
than water.
Regarding the moral economy in these times of globalization, Scott’s theory faces criti-
cism from Marc Edelman, who argues that as the life of the smallholder is under siege
from “... this world of IMF structural adjustment loans; commodity dumping; intellectual
property rights; new markets for credit, technology and services; and giant agrobusiness
conglomerates” (Scott 2005:397), the peasant’s reaction to the imposed change must es-
calate in accordance to the external escalation of pressure upon them. Scott agrees, to
some extent, but cannot see how peasants can manage this sort of large-scale operation
(though Edelman gives him an example) as a more general feature, as the resources avail-
able to them are so limited. He argues that the solution lies on the national, not the
international level, and that the potential for the preservation of these societies (and their
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related products and traditions) lies in an alliance on the national level between farmers,
institutionalized democracy, workers and the remains of the bourgeoisie (Scott 2005:397-
398). The final point to be mentioned here comes up when discussing modernization and
relations to the state. Scott describes the World Bank as working for “... a massive effort
at individual freehold land titling on the neoliberal model” (Scott 2005:401), that cou-
pled with the WTO and IMF attempts a form of international governance in thread with
North Atlantic capitalism (Scott 2005:401). In the end, he concludes, most, if not all,
schemes to “develop” the south are exports from the north - templates to development not
necessarily (and indeed not often) in accordance with small localities in far-flung regions
of the world. We need, then, to take these models into account - for we cannot transcend
them (Scott 2005:401).
Summarizing, the moral economy is the idea that there in some societies are shared
notions of justice and injustice that, if pressured, may override the legislation of the state.
These notions are based on the subsistence ethic, which is based upon every member of
the community’s right to a subsistence minimum - a right which the community has a
duty to ensure. Introducing a system such as the free market into a community that relies
on a subsistence ethic will pit the two economies against each other - the free market is
a system of higher risk (and higher yield, ideally), and driven to maximize profits, not
security, something which is not compatible with the idea of securing subsistence rather
than making a profit. To apply these concepts to a given community, it is important
to contextualize them properly, so as to see how and why this attempted integration of
economies happen. This is best done by seeing the moral economy as one piece in the
greater scheme of things. Especially state formation and state political economy must be
considered, as the state is often the driving force causing market and moral economies
to come into conflict. Furthering the contextualization, social goods can be defined and
utilized for seeing where the economies become incompatible. Societies value their varied
assets differently; there is room for negotiation on some fronts, on others not. By defining
social goods it is possible to see exactly how and why there is moral indignation leading
to resistance or revolt. Finally, the nature of North Atlantic capitalism must be consid-
ered, as it works on the basis of a “model transfer” - the idea that by employing schemes
that, from a northern perspective, are fruitful for the economic development of southern
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societies, “development” is achieved. This model transfer is not always suited to local
conditions, and one can question the idea of a generalized term such as “development” as
even fruitful on an ideological level.
Having clarified what moral economy is, it becomes pertinent to see where, in the context
of this thesis, the moral economy clashes with the market economy and state formation
projects. In the context of Bousraa, this clash happened as a direct result of the estab-
lishment of a rubber plantation, something which is termed a “development project” by
the actors involved (the Cambodian government and the rubber companies).
Development as a project is best explained by first reviewing globalization. Thomas
Hylland Eriksen sums up globalization as the “... processes of increased density, speed
and reach of transnational connections associated with the global spread of capitalism and
new information and communication technologies” (2010:21). Roland Robertson describes
it as referring to “... both the compression of the world and the intensification of con-
sciousness of the world as a whole” (1992:8). In short, by the advances in transportation
and communication technology, the world is “shrinking” (Harvey 1990), allowing actors
to utilize differences in price and supply on a global scale to their profit. This means that
“world actors” are present in many localities, where they again create representations of
the world as a whole in the local community, a process described as glocalization (ibid).
The world has become one place, with all its corners being interconnected via trade, mi-
gration and communication (Hylland Eriksen 2010, Robertson 1992). This, of course, has
an effect on small-scale farmers (such as the ones described in this thesis), in that they
have to relate to much more complex mechanics of exchange than before. Kearney (1996)
calls this process agroindustrialization (1996:127), which he describes as “... an increased
role of transnational corporations in the financing, production, distribution, marketing,
and consumption of agricultural products” (ibid). In the case presented in this thesis, the
peasants are incorporated into this agroindustrialization by way of a development project
sanctioned by their national government and implemented by a multinational corporation
in collaboration with a national corporation - what has brought globalization and capital-
ism on a large scale to the farmers of Bousraa is presented as a scheme in part designed
to “help”, “develop” or even “save” them, presumably from themselves and their way of
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life, which is not compatible with the mechanics of globalization.
A note can be made in this context about rubber as a commodity to illustrate the global-
ization phenomenon. The first European encountering rubber (“caucho - the coagulated
resin of the he´ve´a5” (La Condamine 1736 in CNRTL 2011) was the french explorer Charles
Marie de la Condamine, undertaking an exploratory journey in South America. It is as-
sumed that it originates from the indigenous language Quechua of Peru, and means “the
tree that weeps” (Friederici in CNRTL 2011). This encounter was the linguistic basis for
the European versions of the word (CNRTL 2011) - in French, for instance, rubber is called
caoutchouc. If we follow this word forward in time to the French colonies in Indochina,
and, more specifically, in Cambodia, we see the word again in a similar manifestation
in Khmer language - “kausoo” - derived from the French (Bernard 19026). Further, the
Bunong of Bousraa also spoke of rubber (naturally), and termed it the same way as in
Khmer - “kausoo”. Rubber, then, can be seen as the perfect commodity to illustrate the
colonial expansion, and the expansion of monoculture. The word has traveled the same
way the product has - from the indigenous language in South America centuries ago, to
the margins of Cambodia, all via the French colonial exploit. From being trees in a forest,
rubber has become a worldwide monoculture of commodity production - a commodity
used in industry, and produced for a capitalist market, a product of expansion of the
colonial rule, of the expansion of the capitalist modes of production, and the expansion
of the market. These mechanics have led to two indigenous groups, separated by half the
globe in terms of space and centuries in terms of time, having the same vernacular for the
same tree.
Having put Bousraa into the context of a globalized world, it’s time to move on to de-
velopment in particular. Scott’s (1998;2005) view that most development projects are
exports from the north based on North-Atlantic capitalism sets the scene for most of the
argument here. The term “development” has come to mean the relationship between rich
and poor countries (with an emphasis on the commitment of the rich to help the poor be-
come rich) after the fall of colonialism (Hart/Padayachee 2010:52). This has, in practice,
meant that rich countries implement projects in poor countries to improve living condi-
5Author’s translation (from the French).
6See also: http://www.angkor-planet.com/dico/dicoUKKH.html
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tions; that large amounts of money are transferred to developing nations; and that trade
policies are implemented to ensure that developing nations get access to world markets.
It is, however, sufficient to cast a glance at any published statistic that measures “wealth”
(as in what development is trying to generate - see for instance UNDP (2011)) to see that
this has not worked in any significant way: the poor remain poor and the rich get richer.
The traditional idea behind development was that we must all, as one, strive towards a
universal goal, in this case a minimum of material wealth (Hart/Padayachee 2010:59) -
this being owed largely to the world becoming more and more globalized, generating a
need for universals. The problems, of course, begin when the motives for “development”
are unmasked as plots to incorporate more regions, merchandise and people into a global
economy controlled largely by the rich nations of the north (Scott 2005, Scott 1998). The
postdevelopment school has recognized this fact, and are now arguing for an “end of devel-
opment” based on the ethnocentrism of these exported models, and on the problem with
generating universal definitions of “poverty”, for instance (Hart/Padayachee 2010:61).
I will consider some anthropological ideas regarding the concept “development” here,
more specifically the work of Escobar (1992 & 1995), Ferguson (1990 & 1994) and Gard-
ner/Lewis (1996).
The work of Gardner/Lewis (1996) attempts to give a history of the relationship be-
tween anthropology and development, as well as a history of the term in itself, and ideas
for a more meaningful involvement in a problematic field. In their introduction, they
write:
““Development“, the argument goes, represents the world as in a state of
linear progression and change in which the North is “advanced”, and the South
locked into static traditionalism which only modern technology and capitalist
relations of production can transform.” (1996:1)
The idea of development and “development aid” from North to South are seen as continu-
ations of colonial mechanics (1996:8, Escobar 1995). Ferguson (1990), on the other hand,
sees development agents not as the direct carriers of neo-colonialism, but as someone with
good intentions and horrible results (1990:17). He argues that the reason for the disas-
trous results of so many development projects lies within the misconceptions of those that
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attempt to do development (1990:17). Escobar comments on this, especially in relation to
anthropologists, which he claims have “overlook[ed] the ways in which development oper-
ates as an arena of cultural contestation and identity construction” (1995:15) - and that
this has led to anthropologists being blinded by the opportunity to meet third world “oth-
ers” in the context of development, just as in the context of colonialism (Gardner/Lewis
1996:24). Gardner and Lewis, however, attempts to see beyond the involvement of an-
thropologists in development as a problem, and rather sets out to define a set of goals and
ideals - all the while problematicized - for a more constructive and responsible involve-
ment. Their closing argument is that while any involvement in development practice is
problematic, the methodology and knowledge of anthropology and anthropologists needs
to accompany these processes - as the processes are here, and will not go away (Gard-
ner/Lewis 1996:165-167).
Escobar (1992 & 1995) is more critical to the entire concept and construction of the
concept “development”. He writes:
“Development is understood here as a particular set of discursive power re-
lations that construct a representation of the Third World, whose critical
analysis lays bare the processes by which Latin America and the rest of the
Third World have been produced as “underdeveloped.”” (1992:47)
Further, Escobar sees the discourses surrounding development and the framework it is
set in as three-part: the discourse of the fulfillment of democracy, as an export from
western ideas of egalitarianism; the discourse of difference, which is seen as challenging
the European ethnocentrism; and the anti-development discourses, which originate in the
crisis of development (1992:48). Each of these discourses offers some potential - there is
the potential for material and institutional gains (democracy), the potential for furthering
existing struggles (difference), and, finally, the potential for “exploring alternative ways
of organizing societies and economies, of satisfying needs, of healing and living” (anti-
development) (1992:48). Escobar’s ideas for going beyond development are formulated
like this:
“In the long run, it is a matter of generating new ways of seeing, of renewing
social and cultural self-descriptions by displacing the categories with which
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Third World groups have been constructed by dominant forces, and by pro-
ducing views of reality which make visible the numerous loci of power of those
forces; a matter of “regenerating people’s spaces” or creating new ones, with
those who have actually survived the age of modernity and development by
resisting it or by insinuating themselves creatively in the circuits of capital
and modernization.” (1992:48-49)
The case reviewed in this thesis is one where the classic definition and rhetoric regard-
ing development is present - the idea of modernization as the means to reach prosperity
(Gardner/Lewis 1996) - and as such should be analyzed in that context. The argument of
the thesis overall could be seen as a contribution to the school of postdevelopment: that
in light of local conditions and reactions, a rethinking of what development is and should
be is necessary. This thesis attempts to do so by analysis via moral economies as counter
to capitalist economies.
What we see, then, is that globalization brings development to the margins of society, in
this case to the (until recently) remote northeastern corner of Cambodia. Reflecting again
on the discussion relating to the moral economy, we see a picture forming: development is
forcing itself on subsistence farmers, and forcing them into a mode of production that is
in direct opposition to their subsistence ethic. This has led to a set of reactions within the
community, namely moral indignation towards how, why and for whom it is implemented,
resistance to the project, and attempts at stopping it that on at least one occasion turned
violent. From the global perspective of development and its politics, onwards to the local
- the subsistence farmers and their resistance to a rubber plantation they did not ask for
and do not want.
The empirical basis for The Moral Economy of the Peasant was that of the peasant
revolts in Vietnam - which were full-fledged violent uprisings brought on by the threat
of the subsistence ethic by the free market (Scott 1976). As shown above in the link
between development and moral economy, the premises for such a revolt is present also
in the case at hand. It has, however, only materialized in a flash, and not as a continuous
phenomenon influencing daily life in Bousraa. What we need to elaborate on, then, is the
continuous efforts made by the population to (ideally) halt or slow down the implementa-
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tion of the plantation, what these actions are, and how they fit into the larger scheme of
things. The population employs a varied set of tactics in this regard - from sabotage and
“militant” uprising to disinformation, the seeking out of external allies, demonstration,
slander and protest. Michel de Certeau (1984) describes this kind of tactics as actions
that take place in the space of “the other” (xix). Further, it is described as taking small
action over time, constantly looking for chances to turn situations into “opportunities”
(xix). For an example of one such tactic, de Certeau describes what he calls “la perruque”:
“La perruque is the worker’s own work disguised as work for his employer ...
La perruque may be as simple a matter as a secretary’s writing a love letter
on “company time” or as complex as a cabinetmaker’s “borrowing” a lathe to
make a piece of furniture for his living room ... the worker who indulges in “la
perruque” actually diverts time (not goods, since he uses only scraps) from
the factory for work that is free, creative, and precisely not directed toward
profit.” (1984:25)
Again there is the contrast between making a profit (for another) and making something
based in other values than that of money. The bulk sum of these forms of resistance fit
into the theoretical framework of James Scott (1985), in many ways the definitive work
on peasant resistance. In it, Scott defines them as:
“Everyday forms of peasant resistance - the prosaic but constant struggle
between the peasantry and those who seek to extract labor, food, taxes, rents,
and interest from them. Most forms of this struggle stop well short of outright
collective defiance. Here I have in mind the ordinary weapons of relatively
powerless groups: foot dragging, dissimulation, desertion, false compliance,
pilfering, feigned ignorance, slander, arson, sabotage ... they require little
or no coordination or planning; they make use of implicit understandings
and informal networks; they often represent a form of individual self-help;
they typically avoid any direct, symbolic confrontation with authority” (Scott
1985:xvi)
Scott continues by classifying these actions as representations of a class struggle (ibid):
they are the utilization of the tools at hands to achieve some form of footing within
the power struggle between ruling and subordinate classes (ibid). The outright violent,
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“revolutionary” uprisings are rare, and in general an expression of great desperation (ibid).
Scott continues his argument by showing how this class struggle over time evolves the
peasant’s revolutionary consciousness in regards to avoiding claims on their land, surplus
and modes of production (ibid):
“Their individual acts ... may, in the end, make an utter shambles of the
policies dreamed up by their would-be superiors in the capital ... just as
millions of anthozoan polyps create, willy- nilly, a coral reef, so do the multiple
acts of peasant insubordination and evasion create political and economical
barrier reefs on their own ... And whenever ... the ship of state runs aground
on such reefs, attention is usually directed to the shipwreck itself, and not to
the vast aggregation of petty acts that made it possible.” (ibid:xvii)
A central idea then becomes the accumulated effect of many small acts of defiance and
sabotage - both in practical change (if any is achieved) and as message and communica-
tion regarding the processes that are being protested against. Scott elaborates on this in
his next book (1990). The most notable addition to the discussion regarding resistance
that surfaces from it is the idea of public transcripts and hidden transcripts. He defines
the public transcript as “open interaction between subordinate and those who dominate”
(1990:2) - that is, the forms of interaction that are sanctioned and accepted by those in
power. Hidden transcripts, conversely, “takes place “offstage”, beyond direct observa-
tion by power holders” (ibid:4). These hidden transcripts consist of “speeches, gestures,
and practices that confirm, contradict, or inflect what appears in the public transcript”
(ibid:4-5). This means that we relate to two modes of communication: one that is ac-
cepted, and one that is not - the interaction between transcripts is described by Scott:
“... the frontier between public and the hidden transcripts is a zone of constant struggle
between the dominant and subordinate” (ibid:14). The hidden transcript (or “offstage”
communication) as such becomes an integral part of any form of resistance. It is in the
hidden transcript that any form of organized resistance is planned; it is where the atti-
tudes of the subordinates are shaped; and it is where we may find information as to what
specific acts of resistance mean.
Having gone through the three main theoretical starting points for the analysis of the
situation in Bousraa, we can pinpoint some general connections between the themes of
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moral economy, development and resistance. These connections can be seen almost as
an input-output model, where we have a society based largely on moral economy and
subsistence ethic, which has the market mechanics of globalization imposed upon them
endogenously by the state, a corporation, or, perhaps most likely, by the two in collab-
oration. This imposition generates a set of reactions, as the subsistence ethic is put in
peril; one example would be that a farmer has to give up his land and take wage labor
- wage labor has no substance for a farmer concerned with, primarily, producing enough
food for his family. He not only loses access to his only means of production, he also
subsists on the whim of the economically dominant actors that have “taken” his land
from him. By the mechanics of the global market economy, he is at the mercy of prices
of (for instance) rubber in Africa - should rubber prices drop due to overproduction at a
location thousands of miles from him, or due to the invention of some product making
rubber superfluous, the subsistence the new system has given him will be reduced, or even
vanish. Where his farm previously allowed him a guarantee for a subsistence minimum
in collaboration with the rest of his community, he is now in peril of being thrown into a
subsistence crisis because of factors he can not see or control. What he can see, however,
is the local manifestation of all of these things: the “development project”. As a response
and reaction to this, the community generates resistance - resistance to unfair treatment,
unjust compensation, the removal of important cultural traits, the removal of the com-
munity’s ability to subsist on its own, and so on. In these acts we see the manifestation
of the clash of the global and the local. While the farmer may not be adverse to, for
instance, having improved infrastructure in his community, he will be adverse to having
his land taken from him. In the gray scale between these things lies the meaning of his
resistance, and what it communicates. This can tell us something about what constitutes
meaningful “development” for a subsistence farmer.
Relating this to the case at hand, the puzzle comes together. The Cambodian state
has in this case (and many similar cases) granted concessions for economic development
on land with disputed ownership7. The farmlands of the Bunong population of Bousraa
7Land grabbing is one of the most pressing issues when it comes to human rights in Cambodia. The
government is widely regarded as highly corrupt, and there are doubts towards the legitimacy of many
of the concessions. See Global Witness (2009), Transparency International (2010), Wessendorf (2011),
CHRAC (2009 & 2010), Amnesty International (2011).
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have been leased to a rubber company for the implementation of several plantations - the
total size of the project including all actors (there are other plantations being established
in the area as well) is currently unknown, but at the time of fieldwork, the establish-
ment of the “Varanasi” plantation had led to the clearing of some 2600 hectares of forest,
much (if not most) of it being claimed by the community in Bousraa, and including not
only swidden fields, but fallow land, graveyards, spirit places etc. This project is termed
as “development” in two ways. First, it is part of the development of an until recently
quite inaccessible province in a financial way. Migrants, investors and entrepreneurs are
moving into the province due to this increased accessibility, and the area is opening up
to the exploitation of its natural resources. Secondly, it is part of the state formation of
Cambodia, and the project of the Cambodian government to assimilate its “margins” into
the nation - namely exerting a larger degree of control upon the “unruly and primitive”
indigenous groups inhabiting the area. The project is presented as helping these groups,
by giving them regular jobs and a steady income, and by providing improved infrastruc-
ture. The rhetoric and discussion regarding these aspects are presented in the chapter
on development. The inhabitants of Bousraa, however, do not want this kind of devel-
opment, and as such are resisting the project with whatever means they have. Through
analyzing the acts of resistance in Bousraa, an impression of what works and what does
not is observable. An argument can be made in light of the attempted “development” of
a society based on moral economy that the term “development” is by no means universal,
and by transferring the model of financial development from a capitalist viewpoint onto
a moral economy is not fruitful for either party.
1.3 Places
Before moving on some geographical notes are in order. This section will (briefly) intro-
duce Cambodia, Mondulkiri Province and finally the Bousraa village complex.
Cambodia is situated in Southeast Asia, bordering Thailand to the west and northwest,
Laos to the northeast, Vietnam to the east and southeast, and the gulf of Thailand to
the South. The latest numbers stipulate the population at 13,395,682 individuals (Gen-
eral Population Census (GPC) 2008). The country is governed by the CPP and prime
minister Hun Sen, as it has been since 1985 (Chandler 2007). Cambodia has for the
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last thirty years had a reputation as a war-torn third world country - the civil war, the
Khmer Rouge genocide, a countryside riddled with landmines, widespread human rights
abuses and corruption - not the most charming description of a country. Since the turn
of the millennium Cambodia has regained some of its footing in the region and in the
world. Relative stability has stimulated tourist influx and international investment, and
the country’s GDP is steadily rising (UNDP 2011). The country’s economy is still heav-
ily reliant on foreign aid, however (UNDP 2011), and reports of various forms of human
rights abuses, in several cases carried out by government officials or companies associated
with government officials (see for example Global Witness 2009, Amnesty International
2011) are rife in the media and in the hundreds of NGO reports that are being produced
in the country every year.
Mondulkiri Province is situated in northeastern Cambodia. It borders Ratanakiri Province
in the north, Kratie Province in the west, and Vietnam in the south and east. The de-
mography of Mondulkiri is dominated by various ethnic minority groups, who constitute
the majority of the population (GPC 2008). Mondulkiri is the most sparsely populated
province in Cambodia, with only four individuals per square kilometer (GPC 2008). The
province has not been easily accessible until recent years, which, coupled with the hilly
and densely forested geography, is considered the main reason for it not being very densely
populated. The province first opened up in the early 1960s, when Cambodian soldiers and
their families were sent to Mondulkiri to settle, and to establish a Khmer outpost (Nikles
2006). Since then the province has been relatively separate from the rest of the country,
with only basic travel on road being possible, in addition to airplane travel. With the new
road (finalized in 2010), migration (which has been steadily increasing)8has intensified,
and the province is set to see a much larger influx of lowland Khmers over the next few
years as the province has become more accessible, investment is going into the area, and
jobs are being generated in every sector. Large-scale development in the form of planta-
tions, hydro-power dams, mining ventures and so on are aiming to utilize the province’s
large pool of natural resources, and the tourist trade is also picking up rapidly, with guest-
houses, hotels, restaurants and tour operators being established at a remarkable pace. The
8From 1998 to 2008, the population in Mondulkiri doubled (GPC 2008), and from 1992 to 1998, it
doubled as well (Nikles 2006).
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district capital, Sen Monorom, has gone from being a dusty “frontier”-style village (some
will argue that it is still rather dusty) to being more of a sprawling village turning into
a town, with new buildings of all shapes and sizes emerging rapidly. There are several
national and international NGOs present, and more and more companies are setting up
offices and providing services to inhabitants. Around Sen Monorom there are still several
mainly Bunong villages9, but due to especially land trading and -grabbing, these are be-
coming “watered down” with Khmer inhabitants as access to farmland becomes difficult10.
Bousraa village is situated approximately 42 kilometers from Sen Monorom, in the province’s
Pich Reada District. Bousraa is a “village complex”, meaning that it consists of seven
villages in total, each with their own village chief. In appearance a first-timer would
assume it is one, rather spaced-out, settlement, but in fact it is seven village entities that
have more or less grown into each other. Villagers reported that this came about after
the Khmer Rouge period, when the council of elders decided to move these seven villages
closer to each other in case of similar events in the future. After population growth,
migration and increased construction activity in the area, the villages now appear as one,
with the exception of village four and parts of village one, which are still somewhat re-
tracted from the others. The villages are still predominantly Bunong, but more and more
Khmer lowlanders are moving in, many of them to get jobs related to the establishment
of rubber plantations in the area. When commune authorities were contacted, they gave
the following population data11:
Number of families by ethnicity:
9Two of the villages closest to Sen Monorom, Putang and Lao Ka, are now appearing more or less as
Khmer villages, with the tourism trade being a major factor in income generation, especially in Putang.
Informats in Lao Ka said that so many of the villagers have sold farmland to investors that the possibility
of moving the village is being discussed.
10A process often referred to as “Kmerization” - see for instance Bourdier (2006), Nilkes (2006) etc.
11The data presented here was retrieved from Commune authorities on February first, 2011. The
document that was presented to us was stamped April fourth, 2010.
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Village no. of Families
Ethnicity Bunong Khmer Cham Thai Lao Kraom Kreung
1: Pu’Tit 127 13 0 0 1 0 0
2: Pu’Reang 99 9 0 1 0 0 0
3: Bousraa 95 21 1 0 0 0 1
4: Pu’Teull 102 14 0 0 0 0 0
5: La’Meh 93 42 0 0 0 1 0
6: Pu’Chra 83 24 0 0 0 0 0
7: Pu’Lukh 155 31 0 0 0 0 0
Total 754 154 1 1 1 1 1
Total population by sex:
Village Men Women Total
1: Pu’Tit 315 302 617
2: Pu’Reang 283 223 506
3: Bousraa 255 259 514
4: Pu’Teull 264 245 509
5: La’Meh 293 280 573
6: Pu’Chra 218 262 480
7: Pu’Lukh 445 392 837
Total 2073 1963 4036
A note should be made of the population swelling witnessed during May 2010 - this
influx of in-migrating Khmers is obviously not accounted for in the statistics provided by
the commune authorities. From what could be gathered from informants, migrants and
authorities in Bousraa, however, it is reasonable to assume that several hundred Khmers
can be added to the above statistics.
1.4 Brief Introduction to Ethnic Minorities in Cambodia; the
Bunong
The Bunong are one of several indigenous groups inhabiting the northeastern part of
Cambodia (Bourdier 2006, GPC 2008). They make up the majority of the population
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in Mondulkiri, with a population estimated at 27,262 individuals (GPC 200812). The
majority of the Bunong practice subsistence farming, with highly limited production for
the market, as well as foraging in the forest surrounding villages and settlements (Nikles
2006). Subsistence farming has traditionally been carried out by rotational farming,
where a plot of land is cleared of trees, burnt to the ground, and then planted with a
variety of fruits, vegetables, rice and other plants (i. e. tobacco) (Bourdier 2006, Nikles
2006). The plot is farmed for two to five years before it is abandoned to regrow for a
longer stretch of time, up to 10-15 years (Nikles 2006, Bourdier 2006, informants). The
majority of the Bunong are animist, and as such believe that nature is spirited - there are
spirits living in plants, trees, rocks and water, in household objects, as well as ancestral
spirits, and the needs of these spirits must be observed and tended to ensure the well-
being of individuals, families and villages (Nikles 2006). Due to the impact of Cambodian
society and missionaries, not all Bunong consider themselves animist - a relatively small
percentage are Buddhist, while others again are different varieties of Christians, most
notably Catholic or Protestant. The Bunong population in Bousraa, for instance, is
religiously varied. My main informants were animist or “informal Catholics”, but there
are several churches in Bousraa, and many of the people I talked to belong to these.
The central ethnographic aspects of the Bunong connecting them to the argument in this
thesis are presented in greater detail in chapter 2.
1.5 Methodology
The first and main fieldwork was conducted from early January until late June, 2010, and
was followed by a short fieldwork in January and February of 2011 of approximately five
weeks. The first month was spent going to different Bunong villages with an interpreter,
with a main focus on getting to some of the more far-off settlements in Mondulkiri. Af-
ter having chosen Bousraa as a focal point for my work, I started going back and forth
between Bousraa and Sen Monorom on a daily basis accompanied by an interpreter. In
this period we mainly worked with introducing ourselves in the different villages, finding
key informants and getting a general grasp of the situation. This going back and forth
continued until the middle of April, when I found more permanent lodging in Bousraa
12This data is culled from the statistics based on what was given as native tongue. The exact number
may as such be slightly different, as language is not the only factor for defining ethnicity.
25
by renting a room with a Khmer/Bunong family, having interpreters come and go, and
spending evenings, nights and mornings “alone” in the village. In the beginning, we
conducted semi-structured interviews relating mainly to land, the plantation and the re-
sistance to the establishment of the plantation on village farmland. These conversations
taught us a great deal about who was willing to talk more in-depth, and so we formed
a “collection” of informants that we revisited regularly for longer conversations, all the
while talking to new people in hopes of expanding our outlook. The period in which I
lived in Bousraa was very rewarding, as we had already formed connections with several
informants, and so I could go to visit them on my own and actually keep a thematically
relevant conversation going in simple Khmer (or occasionally very simple English, if some-
one with that capability was present). The conversations often started as one-on-one and
evolved into group interviews as people came by, heard what we were talking about, and
joined in. I was also fortunate enough to be invited to farmlands and forest, and were
as such given more of a practical demonstration of the Bunong’s relationship to their land.
There were some challenges connected to doing fieldwork in Bousraa at this time - par-
ticularly the tension in the village between villagers and government and Socfin KCD
officials. The authorities were wary of foreigners asking questions, which led to me being
“arrested” on several occasions, and forced to produce all manners of papers, and even
being sent to the central police station in Sen Monorom (whose staffing officers didn’t
seem to care whether I was in Bousraa or not). Also, we discovered on several occasions
that informants were outright lying about being part of resistance action, about the times
and places of meetings etc. - all signs of fear in the population as far as I could deduce -
and also, no doubt, reflecting upon the need for trust when discussing these topics. This
is more thoroughly described in chapter four.
Another challenge with doing fieldwork in Bousraa was the language situation. I have
spent a fair amount of time in Cambodia between 2004 and 2010 (approx. 14 months in
total), and so have managed to attain a decent competence in the Cambodian language
(Khmer). The Bunong, however, have their own language which is vastly different from
Khmer, and in which I, at the time of commencing fieldwork, could only say “hello”.
There were several approaches to this problem to consider. First, I could attempt to
26
become fluent (enough) in Bunong. This seemed unrealistic for such a short fieldwork.
Second, I could conduct my interviews in pidgin English and stuttering Khmer. Less than
ideal for building relations. Third, I could engage one or more interpreters, while juggling
(very) basic Bunong and gradually improving my Khmer. Many Bunong speak very good
or decent Khmer, and most Bunong in villages where interaction with Cambodians has
been going on for some time speak Khmer more or less fluently. Young people are also,
in general, fluent in Khmer through schooling. As Bousraa has a fair share of Khmer
inhabitants, and has had for many years, the general level of Khmer-competence among
the Bunong of Bousraa was perceived to be good. This justified focusing the bulk of my
linguistic efforts on Khmer, as I already had a solid base in this language, and was keen
on having the opportunity to conduct interviews not only through an interpreter, even if
using Khmer would limit the number of informants available to me to some degree, as well
as presenting some challenges in regard to using a non-native tongue - key concepts and
specific words are often significant, and meanings between two languages do not always
(or even often) overlap fully. Working with this kind of “approximation” leaves something
to be desired when it comes to linguistic accuracy - this, in the end, was another reason for
choosing to work with interpreters more skilled in both Khmer and Bunong than myself.
I worked with four different interpreters (to ensure access to a variety of informants, as
well as juggling the positionality of both myself and the interpreters - see Borchgrevink
2003) for varying amounts of time.
1.6 Onwards
So, the scene has been set for the continuation of this thesis: in a village pressured by
large-scale international companies establishing operations of overwhelming magnitude on
land that has belonged to the Bunong for centuries, I aim to illustrate the effect of a de-
velopment project on a community based on moral economy and subsistence ethics. The
rest of the thesis aims to identify and explain reactions and counteractions to this by the
society, and to put these actions and reactions into a bigger context of moral economies,
development and resistance
Chapter two deals with presenting relevant ethnography regarding the Bunong, and to
contextualize this ethnography to the moral economy theory, to provide a basis for anal-
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ysis. By isolating specific issues regarding the Bunong, their spirituality, their production
and their relationship to land, an overview of why the ethics of the community are in-
compatible with the ethics of the market economy is presented.
Chapter three goes into the details surrounding the establishment of the rubber plan-
tation “Varanasi” in Bousraa. The role of the Cambodian state in the “development”
of the indigenous communities is discussed, and the rhetoric of both government and
company presented. The picture that emerges is that a capitalist agenda is behind the
wording of the project - that while the project, in part, is presented as an asset and a
major opportunity for the Bunong to “catch up” to the rest of the country, the overall
scheme is to incorporate them into a more controllable population, and to exploit natural
resources that are present on lands that the Bunong, according to the legal framework
in Cambodia, have tenure rights to - something which is conveniently overlooked. This
provides the basis for further analysis of the reactions to the implementation: it becomes
clear that “development” is not quantifiable in any meaningful way.
Chapter four deals with the resistance of the Bunong in Bousraa to the establishment
of the plantation, and looks to uncover and explain different strategies for resisting the
plantation establishment, and for stopping it. In the context of the moral economy and
the idea of development, we can deduct from these actions a communication of what is
acceptable and not, and what is desirable and not from the point of view of the affected
community.
Finally, the conclusion ties these three parts together and presents some concluding
thoughts on the past, present and future of the indigenous groups in Cambodia and
the attempts to “develop” them.
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2 Moral Economy
Figure 3: A mirr near Village 4.
Figure 4: A buffalo is sacrificed for a wedding in Village 1.
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In this chapter I ethnographically examine the Bunong in Bousraa from the perspective
of the moral economy. The chapter starts off with discussing the centrality of land for
the Bunong as an object of production. Furthermore, the chapter considers the Bunong’s
spirituality in their relationship to their land: how their Animist beliefs further enhance
the relationship between community, individual and land. This is followed by defining
land as a social good in Bunong society, which, by restriction of access, can be the basis
for the moral indignation associated with the moral economy concept. Finally, an overall
contextualization of the Bunong and their moral economy is presented.
2.1 Land as Object of Production
To create a meaningful analysis of the Bunong’s relationship to their land, it is reasonable
to start by the physical relationship: land as object of production and basis for subsis-
tence. The Bunong have traditionally practiced swidden/rotational/“slash-and-burn”13
agriculture. This is a trait shared by many of the indigenous groups in Cambodia’s north-
east provinces - the process is well documented in (among others) Bourdier (2006), which
deals primarily with the Tampuan of Ratanakiri Province, north of Mondulkiri, and Nikles
(2006). There are many different ways of carrying out this form of agriculture, but Erni
(2005:4) determines three factors for a minimum definition: it entails an alteration be-
tween a short span of cultivation and a longer span of fallow, it entails the regular shifting
of fields, and it entails the removal of natural vegetation, normally by use of fire.
In the case of the Bunong, the plot (hereafter termed by the Bunong word mirr 14) is
indeed cleared by fire. This takes place at the end of the dry season (in April/May),
after trees and brush have been cut down on the mirr for approximately the preceding
month. After the wood and brush has been burnt, the mirr is covered in ash, which acts
as fertilizer for the coming crops. The mirr is then sown after first rain. The crops are
varied - the main product is dry rice of different varieties, and this crop is interspersed
with a variety of vegetables (aubergine, corn, yams etc.), fruits and occasionally tobacco
and cotton. This varied crop in general totals about one quarter to one third of the total
13The term used hereafter will be swidden agriculture, in accordance with ethnographically similar
material (Bourdier, Nikles etc.)
14Mirr is Bunong for “forest field” (approximately) - the word is similar in several indigenous languages
in the area, see for instance Bourdier (2006), who uses miir.
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production on the mirr (Bourdier 2006). The mirr is farmed for two to three years, and
then left fallow for five to ten years15. This fallow period will, ideally and given enough
time, ensure the complete regrowth of the forest before it is cut down and burned anew.
The mirrs are “phased out” of the farming cycle: small crops of various kinds can be sown
on them without re-clearing, for instance, and regrowth yields various other products that
are gathered when the land is fallow (see below). It is common for one household to farm
one or two mirrs, each one normally 0.5-1ha.16 (Bourdier 2006, Nikles 2006, Informants),
and some villages also have the occasional communal mirr, or other social mechanism to
guarantee everyone some form of harvest (White 1996). Herein lies an interesting aspect
regarding the subsistence ethic: by varying crops, farm locations and having several plots
available, the household ensures a production that is geared towards not the creation
of surplus and profit via sale (although this certainly happens), but towards securing a
needed yield for individual, family, household and community. If one crop fails, another
may succeed, if one mirr is struck by flooding, another will be OK, and so on.
Some villagers have also started cash cropping of various kinds. The most common prod-
ucts at the time of fieldwork was cassava and cashew nuts17, which are farmed in more
permanent fields (cassava) or orchards (cashew). The produce is collected by wholesalers
and brought onto the market. This is, however, not the produce that represents the bulk
of the Bunong’s interaction with local markets: first and foremost there is resin tapping.
Liquid resin is gathered from the Diptherocarpus trees that are present in the forests
of Mondulkiri. The resin is gathered by cutting a bowl-shaped hole in the trunk of the
15As in Nikles (2006), the information gathered on this subject varied significantly. Informants reported
farming periods as low as one year and as high as five years on one plot, and fallow periods as short as
five years and as long as 15 (!) years.
16This would entail that in Bousraa, with approximately 850 households affected by the Socfin KCD
operation (FIDH 2011), total area of planted miirs would approximate 425-850ha. The concession, in
comparison, is at time of writing totaling approximately 6978ha. Including fallow land (at an estimated
average of two plots per household) the miirs would total approximately 1275-2550ha., still less than half
the area of the concession.
17Cassava was, at the time of fieldwork, by far the most popular - cassava prices were reportedly going
up, and there were difficulties meeting export demands, which led to many farmers changing their primary
crop. This applies to Cambodian as well as Bunong farmers.
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tree, which is then briefly set on fire. The resin seeps into the bowl, and can be scooped
out, poured into cans, and traded. The resin can be sold to wholesalers in the area, or it
can be transported to Sen Monorom. Most villagers involved in resin tapping in Bousraa
reported selling it to wholesalers locally, as the trip to Sen Monorom is long, and the
road is not in the best of conditions, especially in rainy season. The resin is used for
boats (for varnishing the hull), torches, and paint products (Baird 2003). Resin tapping
is considered hard work (as the trees are often deep in the forest), but the gains are seen
as outweighing the costs, and the collection is the most important source of income for
many families. In times of dearth, the resin can also be traded directly for rice (Nikles
2006).
Via the resin tapping and cash crops we can see the beginning relationship between
the Bunong and the market. This is a process that is changing rapidly, but in general
principles, not that much is different. The villagers still rely mainly on production for
subsistence, and aim to get what they need from their mirrs, paddy fields, vegetable gar-
dens and foraging trips. In addition to this, the resin collection is used to supplement
self-production with either cash or merchandise that can not be produced locally, such as
salt, MSG18 and petrol. Villagers in Bousraa also mentioned several “luxury goods” such
as clothes and phone cards when asked what they used money made from resin tapping for.
Another important reason for the prevalence of swidden agriculture in the northeast is
the natural environment itself. Contrary to lowland Cambodia, the two northeastern
provinces are not especially flat. For paddy rice cultivation (which is also present in the
highlands, see below), a flat field is required, and steady access to water needs to be main-
tained. While the yields of the dry rice may not be as impressive as that of the paddy
varieties, paddy cultivation is much more susceptible to natural intervention destroying or
reducing crops (Bourdier 2006, Informants). Furthermore, the varied crops of the swidden
plots are not possible in rice paddies, as they are flooded after planting and remain so
until harvest. Keeping in mind, then, that the main focus of villagers have primarily been
on ensuring subsistence, the mirrs are in every way competitive compared to the paddy
fields - not in ideal yield, but in yield predictability and stability.
18Monosodiumglutamate. Popular flavor enhancer used in virtually all cooking in Southeast Asia.
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The practice of paddy rice cultivation was adapted by the indigenous communities in
the northeast after the Khmer Rouge regime19. During this period, most villagers were
relocated to Koh Njek district in northern Mondulkiri, and forced to work in labor camps,
mainly with farming rice paddies. Having learned the techniques during this period, some
villagers continued this practice upon returning to their villages in the early 80s, in cases
where the soil was suitable. Various reasons are given for why people choose to farm
paddy rice as well as mirr rice. The potential for higher yield is mentioned, also the
relatively limited amount of labor that needs to be done to plant paddy compared to the
clearing and burning of the mirr. Another aspect is the option to use buffaloes for some of
the more strenuous tasks, if the household or village has access to livestock. The variety
of the crop is maintained, however, by planting vegetables and fruits in a smaller garden,
or by farming both paddy and mirr.
The forest areas surrounding villages are also utilized without the harnessing of nature
involved in the preparation of mirrs. Villagers forage for a variety of fruits, vegetables
and roots in surrounding forests, and also on the mirrs that lay fallow. Fish are caught
in streams, and hunting has also supplemented the diet of the Bunong, although this is
gradually becoming impossible due to restrictions and legislation implemented as part of
various conservation programs. Wild honey is gathered from the forest, as is bamboo.
A note should be made here about the distribution of land and resin trees in the vil-
lages. Nikles (2006) defines the forest land as a “common pool resource”, meaning that
the villagers have equal stakes in the produce of the forest, and land for mirrs. How-
ever, resin trees are owned individually - who owns the trees can be identified by the way
they are cut to drain resin. The distribution of resin trees is based on simply finding
an untapped tree first, and this tree being within the accepted boundaries of the forest
belonging to the village. The resin trees are inherited when the owner dies or can not tap
them any more. There are some issues connected to the idea of the forest as a “common-
pool” resource in the example of Bousraa. First of all, the clearing of large tracts of
19The Khmer Rouge regime lasted from 1975 until 1979. During this time, approximately 1.4-2.2
million people perished due to mass executions, starvation and disease under one of the most murderous
“communist” projects ever undertaken. See for instance Chandler (2007).
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this communal resource by Socfin KCD has led to problems in defining and distributing
compensation, as there is no real individual demarcation, except in the form of use (see
chapter three). Secondly, there is the conflict that has arisen between a ban on clearing
“fresh” forest for miirs (Nikles 2006) and increased population density. In Bousraa this
conflict is clearly defined in terms of people losing access to their land: there is not enough
to go around, and with population increase and the clearing of large tracts for the planta-
tion, the problem grows significant. Informants reported that while they could clear more
plots in the past, as well as keeping fallow land, the ban combined with the loss of land in
connection to the plantation has left many people with less than they “should have”, as
all available land was “taken”. Some informants reported wanting to go further away to
find room for their miirs, but were unsure if this was a good idea, as they would have to
travel far from their homes for longer periods of time, and transport costs connected to
the harvest would also become an issue. In short, a community which has relied on free
and common-pool access to their object of production has started developing a culture of
ownership as an individual trait, not a communal one. Those that were lucky enough not
to have their farms compromised by the concession (yet) are as such left with a greater
set of resources than those who lost their land in the clearings. The common-pool rela-
tionship to resources can, however be seen in the distribution mechanics still prevalent in
Bousraa.
Regarding distribution mechanics, some notes should be made. If we first consider Joanna
White’s 1996 study of the “indigenous highlanders of the northeast“, an interesting ex-
ample is mentioned:
“At certain times of need there are also communal village systems to turn to.
For example, when a new village house is being built it is not unusual for each
household to make male labor available to assist in construction; this assistance
is eventually reciprocated. Different groups have different mechanisms for
support. The Phnong [Bunong], for example, have a tradition whereby at the
time of harvesting their staple crop of rice they invite relatives and friends to
assist them during the first day of harvesting.” (1996:20)
The heavier workloads in families and extended families are shared among the villagers.
When it comes to the specific periods of harvest, or forms of emergencies or periods where
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the available workforce is limited, there is also a system for lightening the workload:
“Extended family groups assist each other at key stages of the agricultural
cycle when work is particularly pressing or difficult, such as when trees must
be cut to clear new areas of forest, or during the harvest, or in times of labor
shortage due to death or illness. When rice stocks run low it is also common
for borrowing to take place between members of the extended family. This
exchange of labor and goods amongst kinship groups often takes place on an
inter-village basis.” (1996:20)
Furthermore, there is the system of communal mirrs, rice deposits for the community, and
granary systems (1996:20). No informants in Bousraa told of such practices being followed
today, but they have been documented in other studies of the indigenous groups of the
northeast (White 1996, Bourdier 2006), and old people in the village still remembered
them. As one elderly woman reported:
“Before, if there was a problem with a field, we would help each other. Maybe
someone else had a very good harvest and would give those in need some
baskets of rice, or they could help on another farm and have rice in return.
This does not happen as often anymore. Now people are more interested in
money.” Informant in village 4.
What does still exist, however, is the “lending” of labor between families and extended
families at the beginning of harvest season, and in building houses and undertaking other
major tasks. It is also common for the inhabitants of Bousraa that still have ample access
to land20 to allow members of family and extended family to help with the farming or even
“borrow” a plot for farming for themselves, in return for labor on farms or orchards of
the owner. So, even if there are no communal mirrs in Bousraa today, the redistribution
of produce through the exchange of labor is very much present - and as such assuring a
minimum of subsistence for members of the community through the exchange of labor.
This is perceived as fair and right by villagers, which concurs with the notion of the sub-
sistence ethic: the exchange has to be fair and for the good of the community.
20The plantation projects in Bousraa have affected the different villages and households to varying
degrees. Some families still have access to most of their mirrs and fallow land, while others have no land
left of any kind. See chapter on development for discussion of this in terms of generating difference.
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Having demonstrated how the Bunong farm and gather from their mirrs, paddies and
forests, and how produce and land is distributed in the village, it is time to link this
relationship to nature and production to the subsistence ethic theory. Recapping from
chapter one, the subsistence ethic is determined by how the community distributes prod-
uct internally, and by what mechanisms exist (or don’t exist) in the form of safeguards
for subsistence for the community as a whole. What we see, then, is that the whole
system of production is geared towards safety and stability, not yield and profit. The
objects of production are as such completely dependent on a symbiotic relationship to
the natural environment surrounding the villages, as the depletion of soil, deforestation
or dispossession would cause the system of production to become less secure and reliable.
This relationship, and the goal of subsistence rather than profit and surplus, form the
basic idea of the subsistence ethic of the Bunong.
From the previous sections, it becomes apparent that there is grounds to claim a subsis-
tence ethic for the Bunong of Bousraa. The original nature of the Bunong’s system of
production is one that favors security rather than possible yield, and in the case of uneven
distribution due to accident, death, natural causes or a rubber plantation, labor can be
exchanged as long as there are still farmers that have arable land, orchards or paddies.
Via the exchange of labor and the redistribution of crops and farmland, the society and
its members are secured a subsistence minimum one way or the other. These mechanics
have roots in smaller village systems, when families were linked tightly together and could
depend on each other to “see each other through” - but are firmly rooted in Bunong cul-
ture, and as such are present today, even in a relatively large and “diluted” set of villages
as the ones in Bousraa. This notion of “community first” and the mechanics that make
it possible, constitute the subsistence ethic of the Bunong.
Having established the subsistence ethic, it is time to investigate further the relationship
between the Bunong and their land - this time regarding their spirituality/religion. We
will see that this further implicates the subsistence ethic, and finally the moral economy
through the definition of land as an important social good in Bunong culture.
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2.2 Land as Spiritual Good
The majority of the Bunong are Animists, as were the majority of the informants inter-
viewed for this study. This has implications for how the Bunong relate to their land, and
how they see the land not as detached from the humans, but as an environment shared
with spirits of the forest, of the rice, of the trees and of the ancestors.
First of all a note on what Animism implies: Animism is the belief that natural envi-
ronments are inhabited by “spirits”. This means that beyond what can be seen, there
is another realm existing alongside this one, where ancestors are still present and have
the power to interfere in the lives of individuals (and vice versa), where there are “good”
spirits that have the power to help and “angry” spirits that may cause sickness or death.
These spirits must be appeased at crucial times of the year to ensure harvests or rain,
for instance, and in cases of the breaking of taboos, crime and other “negative” actions
(White 1996, Nikles 2006). The spirits are appeased by sacrifice, mainly of livestock (buf-
faloes, pigs and chickens being the most common animals - buffaloes reserved for special
occasions as a result of their cost) and of jar wine21. After sacrifice, the meat is divided
according to the occasion and the participants, and rice beer is drunk. The appropriate
sacrifice for the different occasions is normally determined by village elders, although cer-
tain situations carry certain flexibilities - adjustments occur in terms of villagers’ wealth,
of the offense in question and so on. For instance, at a wedding I attended in Bousraa,
the elders had decided that the couple had to sacrifice a pig in addition to the already
planned sacrifice of a water buffalo, as the elders had discovered that the couple had en-
gaged in premarital sex. This is considered inappropriate, and so the sacrifice was made
to safeguard the couple and the rest of the villagers from potential sickness as a result
of angered spirits. The goodwill of the spirits is as such seen as an integral part of the
welfare of the community - the inappropriate acts of the couple could not just potentially
harm themselves, they could also anger the spirits to such an extent that the whole village
would suffer illness. Nikles (2006) states:
“... ceremonies are not just held for the spiritual forces of the natural envi-
ronment, but also in order to appease and respect the spirits of the ancestors.
21This drink is brewed in clay jars in the different households. Spirits are believed to inhabit the jars,
and so the drinking of the jar wine often has religious overtones.
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Because if they are neglected or angered, they can influence human life by
bringing sickness, death or a bad harvest to their relatives. All ceremonies,
irrespective of the reason, involve jar wine and the sacrifice of an animal, most
often a chicken or a pig.” (2006:55)
She also states the most common reasons for holding ceremonies, which include general
sickness, protection from spirits, a longer absence from the village, pregnancy complica-
tions, a new house has been built, a birth in the village, a wedding, the playing of gongs
or jangs or if using water from a spirit well (2006:55).
The Bunong agricultural year and its different stages are marked by different ceremonies
undertaken at more or less regular intervals over the course of the year. These ceremonies
are meant to appease the different spiritual entities that are believed to inhabit the farm-
lands, the forest, and the rice, as well as those of the ancestors. The two main ceremonies
that are performed to secure the harvest are the rice ceremonies and the rain ceremonies.
There are normally between two and four ceremonies for the rice, and they are conducted
by the members of the household, in the mirr (Nikles 2006, informants). The intent of
the rice ceremonies is to ensure a good harvest, and to prevent the crops from being
destroyed before they can be harvested (i. e. from insects). Neighbors and relatives (and
the occasional anthropologist) are commonly invited to partake in these ceremonies. The
rain ceremonies are somewhat different. They are undertaken twice a year; first at the
end of the dry season to ask the spirits for rain, and for a good harvest, and then again at
the end of the harvest to thank the spirits for the same. These ceremonies are carried out
communally, to show the spirits that the community stands together, and that everyone
is dedicated to their well-being. An interesting note on this point is that villagers who
grow paddy rice also perform these ceremonies: it is not limited to those who prepare
mirrs. The spiritual relationship to the land is the same, regardless of the production
mode carried out on it. Bousraa has paddy fields to the west and southeast, and villagers
interviewed for this study were engaged in both the cultivation of mirrs and paddies.
The agricultural cycle and the rituals associated with it shows us that the spirits of
the land are important to the system of production of the Bunong. If the spirits are not
at ease, the harvest may fail, which could lead, in the worst possible scenario, to hunger
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over the coming months. The communality of the rain rituals also illustrates that the
connection to the natural environment (and the spirits that inhabit it) is a relationship
shared by the village as a whole, and any failure to appease the spirits would affect all
the members of the community - either by diminished crops or by sickness etc.
Another illustration of the connection between the Bunong and their land is the us-
age of the forest as burial grounds. The Bunong bury their dead in coffins in selected
graveyard sites in the forest, normally close to their villages. Graves are covered with
what looks like little houses; normally a frame and a roof of sorts, the more recent ones I
observed had two sheets of tin for a roof. The burial ceremonies are manifold, beginning
with the day of the burial, when a sacrifice is made, jar wine is drunk, and an empty jar
is half-buried near the head of the deceased. For the following days, the family of the
deceased bring gifts to the grave, especially foodstuffs, cigarettes, drinks and such, to help
make the transition to the “new world” easier. After seven days another ceremony is held,
where there is another sacrifice, more jar wine, and the construction of the grave house.
After one year the final ceremony is held, this is the most significant of the ceremonies. It
involves more people, more sacrifices and a more extensive arrangement. After this, the
grave is not visited again.
While burial forest is not taboo to enter, it is still a sacred place. If people have re-
cently passed, their spirits are still “lingering” (until the very final ceremony one year
after death), and should not be disturbed unnecessarily. Villagers will not establish mirrs
in burial forest, but may harvest wild plants etc. There was a case in Bousraa where
the rubber companies bulldozed and completely cleared the burial forest of several com-
munities, which caused great unrest and anger; in the affected communities and in the
villages. As the spirit of ancestors have the ability to affect living villagers’ health and
well-being, the massive distortion of their peace was seen as an enormous threat to the
village as a whole. This incident is discussed in some detail in the “Development” chapter.
A note should be made here on the other religions present in Bunong communities - Chris-
tianity in Bousraa in particular. Many Bunong have over the recent decades converted to
either Protestantism or Catholicism. Villagers give various reasons for the conversions,
39
but the most common ones seem to be either that it happened as a result of fleeing to
Vietnam during the Khmer Rouge regime, where they learned the ways of Christianity
from friends and relatives, that they were frustrated with the spirits demanding constant
sacrifices without providing tangible results (especially prevalent in individuals or families
that have lost family members to illness), or the input given by missionaries working in
the area. Bousraa has a thriving community of Christians - there are several churches,
and sermons are held every Sunday. It seems to be the case, though, that a conversion to
Christianity does not necessarily mean a complete break with Animist traditions. Several
Christians said that they still liked to participate in the ceremonies and rituals of their
Animist relatives and friends. They regard performing sacrifices and enjoying themselves
drinking jar wine as something unproblematic to partake in, even if it is part of a “differ-
ent” religion than theirs. From what I could gather after several interviews on the subject
of religion, the Catholics are more liberal in this regard, while the Protestants seem to
more explicitly distance themselves from Animist tradition. Conversion to Buddhism
seems more or less non-existent (except for intermarried Khmer-Bunong couples where
both religious traditions are honored). This was described to me as a result of Christian-
ity, its worldview and its vocabulary22 being more suited to the animist predispositions
of the Bunong: there is not that big a difference in believing in many spirits in many
places and believing in one (the greatest) spirit in all places23. It is reasonable to assume
that the added economic advantage of not having to spend money, wine and livestock for
ceremonies has also played a part in several conversions.
The rituals performed for the spirits also hold value as redistribution mechanics. In
the larger communal ceremonies, for instance, those families that have more livestock
are expected to contribute more to the sacrifices, thus distributing this wealth between a
larger group of individuals. In one case where the villagers of village 2 in Bousraa were
offered and accepted compensation from Socfin KCD (due to a graveyard forest being
cleared), the buffalo that was slain (paid for by Socfin KCD) was redistributed by weight
22A missionary working with the Mnong Gar in Vietnam allegedly told Norman Lewis of his frustrations
with converting “savages” in the 1940s and 50s; he had tried to have the phrase “Jesus loves you!”
translated into the local language in a meaningful way, and, having explained the core concepts to
interpreters, had been presented with the phrase: “The great spirit is not angry!” (Lewis 1951).
23This is, of course, an oversimplification, but it is in thread with what villagers reported in interviews.
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to villagers that were affected by the clearing, with those that had most graves destroyed
getting the most, and villagers that were unaffected getting a significantly smaller amount
of meat - but getting some part of the animal all the same. During a wedding ceremony I
attended, where sacrifices were made of a buffalo, two pigs and several chickens, the meat
was distributed by kinship affiliation to the two families, but with all attendees having a
small claim in the animal - even I, as a mere observer, was offered and expected to take
my share of the buffalo 24. The exchange of sacrificial meat can also represent the forming
of alliances between families, clans or groups, pledging allegiance to each other by way of
ceremonies (see Condominas (1957)25)
What we see from these paragraphs is that spirits play an important role in the ev-
eryday lives of the Bunong. They are perceived to have powers to influence the daily
lives of villagers, and to, if angered, bring great misfortunes on individuals, families and
villages. They are important in securing subsistence, in making sure a marriage is happy
and successful, in welcoming a child into this world, and in sending another one off into
the next. The ancestral spirits have specific needs that must be tended to, or they, too,
can bring misfortune to the village. They must not be upset, or they will interfere with
the daily lives of villagers. The spirits are, as such, a controlling force in the lives of
villagers. An interesting example can be found in Bourdier (2009):
“While working for an NGO in Ratanakiri in the early 1990s, an anthropolo-
gist recalled villagers’ responses when he asked what they wanted in order to
improve their health. Villagers replied without hesitation: more buffaloes for
spiritual offerings. For lesser diseases of misfortune which occurred amongst
householder, pigs and chickens were also considered appropriate medicine”
(Bourdier 2009:34, quoting Jonsson 1997).
What emerges from this example and from the above, is that the relationship to the spir-
its, and thus to the land, is an important part of perceived welfare in the communities.
Paying tribute to the spirits through ceremonies allows for the securing of good health, the
increased chance of a good harvest, and the protection from bad luck for the community.
The spirits are, as such, part of the welfare system that exists in the villages. The analogy
24The present stake in a buffalo for a foreign anthropologist seems to be approximately 200 grams.
25Especially “Baap Can’s Alliance. An Exchange of Buffalo Sacrifices” (1957:19-80)
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may be a stretch, but one is inclined to think about paying tax where I’m from - for this
money I get healthcare. The Bunong pay tribute to the spirits, and so, hopefully, will not
need healthcare. This is of course an enormous oversimplification - this is not to say that
the Bunong do not need proper healthcare - but on a conceptual level there are similarities.
There is also the moral aspect of ritual: that ritual dictates what constitutes “good”
or “proper” behavior. As in the example mentioned above regarding premarital sex, this
is an illustration of what is considered acceptable acts by villagers. As such the rituals
and sacrifices also comprise a system of punishment for acting inappropriately - a moral
code, if you will. The village elders decide what compensation must be paid to the spirits
for an indecent act, and the ceremony is carried out, just as in the case of sickness. In
the case of conflicts between villagers, for instance, it is common for the conflict to be
mediated by elders, and the conflict resolved by way of ceremony and the sharing of meat
and rice wine (Nikles 2006).
One final example will be mentioned here before moving on, and that is the issue of
land and identity. While perhaps not being directly a spiritual relation, it is still signifi-
cant for many of the same reasons that religion is significant - especially since it seems,
for some informants, to transcend the question of religion and isolate a relationship to
land that exists independently of it.
In several conversations with people in Bousraa, the question of identity was raised.
Informants would claim that the company was out to “destroy” the Bunong, for instance,
which led to a discussion about what it means to be Bunong. Many informants, indepen-
dently of their religious beliefs26, stated that language and agriculture were the two main
factors27 determining Bunong identity. This adds another dimension to the discussion of
the relationship between the Bunong and their land: the fact that the Bunong perceive
themselves as linked to their land by their identity in itself. The removal of this land,
26The group of people with which I discussed this the most consisted of Animists and Catholics. The
Catholics appear to be fairly liberal when it comes to inter-religious compatibility - many would partake
in Animist ceremonies, even if they did not believe in their effect anymore.
27For others again, religion, the Animist ceremonies and the spirits were also on this list. The example
is included for added depth.
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then, would imply (for some) the removal of an integral part of who they are, who they
have been and who they want their children to be. For example:
“The way we use the land - from farming our mirrs to gathering resin and
honey - this is what makes us Bunong. If they take this away, we will only
have our language. Many of us have changed their religion, but we are still
using the land as we always have.” Informant in village 1.
Land and agriculture are seen as culture- and identity-bearing components of the commu-
nity by these informants. They strongly believe that the changes they are going through
may end up “destroying” what it means to be Bunong, and so, finally, “destroying” the
Bunong as a group identity and a culture. This “destruction” is examined in greater
detail in chapter 3.
Having established that the Bunong’s relationship to land is also an issue of spirituality
and identity, it is time to move to the last part of the discussion about this relationship:
defining the land of the Bunong as a social good. As access to this social good is be-
ing restricted we see moral indignation in the communities, which attests to the moral
economy being challenged.
2.3 Land as Social Good
Remembering from chapter one that moral economy theory has largely been based on
the incorporation of non-market societies into the open market and the resulting unrest
from this operation (Scott 1976, Thompson 1963 & 1971 etc.), a few points should be
made. First off all, there has been contact between the Bunong and lowland traders for a
long time, and recent decades have seen this contact increase (Nikles 2006) without there
being violent resistance or uprisings. The acts of resistance seem to be connected more to
the detaching of land from communities rather than simply that of forcing a community
to relate to the market. This is, of course, a bit of a blurry argument - you could argue
that the detachment would not happen if it wasn’t for the open market moving in on the
natural resources that have traditionally been utilized by the Bunong, and that would
be absolutely right. However, it can be fruitful to expand the basis on which to make
an analysis of the moral economy of the Bunong by introducing Arnold’s (2001) idea of
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social goods. The idea of social goods as basis for a moral economy entails that while the
incorporation of non-market economy into market economy is a viable approach, a much
broader analysis is possible if we regard certain key elements in a community as the social
goods upon which the community base their self-conception. Arnold uses water in the
American west as his examples. I will attempt to use land in northeastern Cambodia as
the same.
As we have seen, the Bunong have had market relations with the lowlanders for some
time, and these relations are still present, especially in the resin trade, where the Bunong
have supplied a market with a commodity that is at their disposal. While the Bunong
have experienced exchange to be unfair in these transactions (White 1996), they have
not been the cause for more unified acts of outrage, protest or resistance. These acts
have been reserved for situations where dispossession of large amounts of land have been
imposed on communities. There were massive protests connected with the Chinese com-
pany Wuzhisan establishing a pine plantation in Mondulkiri on a government concession,
for instance (CDRI 2005:117), and there are and have been similar acts in progress in
Bousraa since the first clearing in the Socfin KCD concession. What we see is that for the
Bunong’s moral economy to be challenged, the simple mechanics of unfair exchange are
not enough. In light of the relationship to land described above, I regard the land of the
Bunong as a social good upon which several key concepts withing their community rests.
Having seen how Arnold uses water and the access to it as integral for the placement
of communities in the west, it is time to adapt his concept to the Bunong. The relation-
ship to land can be seen as comprising of four key factors. Firstly: land is the object
of production. This, of course, entails that to produce energy for subsistence and repro-
duction, land is key. As we have seen through the description of the subsistence ethic,
this production is also used to, by way of redistribution of harvest and labor, secure all
members of the community a subsistence minimum. Secondly: land is important for vil-
lagers’ health through the relationship to the spirits that are inhabiting it. If these spirits
are angered, the health of villagers may worsen. Thirdly: land is a welfare component
in the Bunong’s worldview. By securing good relations to the spirits, and by practicing
redistribution of goods and labor via various forms of exchange, the overall welfare of the
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community is assured. Lastly: the land of the Bunong is important to Bunong identity:
the Bunong identify and define themselves by their relationship to their land, and regard
the removal of the land and the practices connected to it as a direct attack upon their
identity as a group. The removal, detachment or dispossession of land is as such an at-
tempt to remove the very basis upon which the Bunong’s community rests, and this is
more than can be tolerated.
In this we find a plausible explanation for the moral outrage seen in Bousraa in con-
nection with the establishment of the plantation. By the reshaping of Bunong farmland
into a monoculture landscape of rubber trees, the communities lose their object of pro-
duction, their basis for subsistence, they are in danger of the wrath of the spirits which
may cause sickness or death, the communities risk becoming detached because of the
increased inequality resulting from not having redistribution mechanisms anymore, and
they lose their identity as self-subsistence forest farmers. This discussion goes on in chap-
ter 3, in relation to the actual processes going on in Bousraa and how people respond
to them. What we can see from the perspective of social goods is that there is a moral
economy at play in Bousraa, one that has its perimeters and that will make inhabitants
react if it is severely compromised. The Bunong may tolerate unfair trade, various taxing
schemes from local authorities and even legislature that reduces access to farmlands (see
Nikles (2006) on government policies banning the clearing of “fresh” forest for swidden
agriculture, for instance) - these are smaller infractions that exist in a framework where
there is flexibility to discuss whether the claim is fair or not. The massive undertaking
in Bousraa, on the other hand, holds no such flexibility - if there ever was any, the way
the project was implemented was sure to eradicate it for good, as we will see in the next
chapter.
2.4 Moral Economy and the Bunong
Before moving on to the discussion of the “development” of Bousraa, a brief recap is in
order. Due to the relationship between the Bunong and their land, and the outrage that
emerges when this relationship is challenged, we can talk about the moral economy of
the Bunong. This moral economy explains the reaction to the challenged access for the
Bunong to their land, as they are faced with in Bousraa by the establishment of the rub-
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ber plantation “Varanasi”. The fact that the implementation of this plantation has left
villagers in bottomless spiritual debt due to the disturbance of the angry forest spirits and
the spirits of the ancestors, as well as leaving them without a secure means of subsistence,
is cause enough for moral outrage in itself. If we then add the notion that land is what
carries the significance of the four concepts subsistence, security, welfare and identity, we
can see land and the access to it as a social good which the Bunong rely on to define
themselves and to subsist as a group. It can be expressed with Mauss’ (1954) idea of the
“total social fact”: Land is not only economical - it is at the same time religious, moral,
aesthetic and so on, and thus holds greater significance in the community than as a mere
breadwinner.
By taking away this land, or more accurately the access to this land through trans-
formation, it is possible to predict the moral outrage that will ensue, as the land held
such a key point in the Bunong societies. Changing the land and the access to it has
ramifications that go beyond a simple means of production-perspective - the plantation
offers waged day labor for those that are willing and able - it shakes the Bunong’s own
idea of what they are in it’s foundations. The fact that the “exchange” in this process
has been perceived as massively unjust (see chapter 3) also fuels the moral outrage in
the communities, and hampers any attempt at rectifying the situation. While there is
willingness in the communities to make the situation work in some way, there is no longer
interest in negotiating, as promises have been made and broken in so many instances that
no trust can be found between the actors. It has come to the point where the community
does not trust the implementers of the plantation, as they have made various promises
regarding compensation, communal goods, choices relating to new land, and so on, and
the plantation owners and coordinators are blaming the community for lying about the
land they have used, while the government has claimed ignorance and left it to the local
actors to resolve the situation. It is a mess of miscommunication and violation of basic
rights, and as such the resistance now met by the plantation companies can be seen as a
result of just this: the failure to regard the Bunong as a group whose culture and identity
is centered around the idea of self-subsistence and land tenure in a spirited natural envi-
ronment. As we will see from the following chapter, the project has in many ways taken a
jab at the core values of the local communities, and resistance is as such, not surprisingly,
46
widespread.
The next chapter deals with the specifics around the detachment of land from the commu-
nities in Bousraa, namely the implementation of the rubber plantation “Varanasi”, how
the concession was granted, a timeline for the implementation and the reactions it met in
the community. We will see that we are not, in fact, talking about “development” in the
general perception of the word, we are talking about underdevelopment: the generating
of negative economical change for a community that has been based on a subsistence
economy rather than a profit-maximizing economy.
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3 Development
Figure 5: “Sustainable Development” according to Socfin. Image taken from
http://www.socfin.com/
Figure 6: “Sustainable Development” in practice? The “Varanasi” plantation in Bousraa,
February 2010.
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Having seen that the moral indignation in Bousraa can be linked to the Bunong’s moral
economy, it is time to focus on and analyze the specific case at hand: the establishment
of the rubber plantation “Varanasi” in Bousraa.
First, a general overview of what “development” constitutes in the Cambodian context
is presented. Drawing on examples from various reports and studies, I show that the
development that is being imposed on communities with the sanction of the state is not
necessarily meaningful for the same communities. This discussion is linked to James
Scott’s ideas of high modernism as a state-formation project. Bousraa is contextualized
into this framework as part of the margins of the Cambodian state. Secondly I present an
overview of the situation in Bousraa from concession date until present day. I show how
some patterns are forming: that the way the project was and still is implemented is not
compatible with the Bunong and their ideas about development. In the third part of this
chapter, the ideas of development that exist within the Bunong population in Bousraa
are examined and voiced. The villagers feel like they are being treated like a group that
do not know their own good by those that hold decision-making power in the project, al-
though they have distinct ideas about how they want to be treated, what they are willing
to change, and what is “destruction”, not development. The idea that the term develop-
ment is not compatible with both sides of the conflict starts to emerge, and is furthered
in the fourth section of the chapter, which deals with what meanings are incorporated
into the “development” paradigm. These meanings are vastly different, which means that
the project is a fallacy on the level of “development” as ideal: the introduction of this
group into a market economy does not generate opportunity and sustainability, it gener-
ates difference and underdevelopment. Finally, some conclusions on what development is
and should be are drawn.
3.1 Development in Cambodia: Capitalist State Formation?
“... the most tragic episodes of state development in the late nineteenth and
twentieth century originate in a particularly pernicious combination of three
elements. The first is the aspiration to the administrative ordering of nature
and society ... “High modernism” seems an appropriate term for this aspi-
ration ... The second element is the unrestrained use of the power of the
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modern state as an instrument for achieving these designs. The third element
is a weakened or prostrate civil society that lacks the capacity to resist these
plans. The ideology of high modernism provides, as it were, the desire; the
modern state provides the means for acting on that desire; and the incapaci-
tated civil society provides the leveled terrain on which to build (dis)utopias.”
(Scott 1998:88-89)
Scott’s three elements could have been targeted at Cambodia specifically. The Cambodian
state is increasingly granting concessions for the development of large tracts of land all
over the country, thus formulating its “aspiration to the administrative ordering of nature
and society”. These projects are then enforced by the power monopoly (the police and
the army) in the “unrestrained use of the power of the modern state for achieving these
designs”. The civil society, those that have claims in the concession areas, “lack the
capacity to resist these plans”. The government it perceived as highly corrupt28, giving
concessions to the highest bidder without regard for its own legislation. Through the
cornucopia of NGO reports, UN reports and newspaper articles that surface about issues
like these every year29, we see the contours of Scott’s “high modernism” as applicable to
the Cambodian government and it’s state formation project. It can be useful here to look
further into what constitutes this “high modernism”. As Scott puts it:
“What is high modernism, then? It is best conceived as a strong (one might
even say muscle-bound) version of the beliefs in scientific and technical progress
that were associated with industrialization in Western Europe and North
America from roughly 1830 until World War I. At its center was a supreme
self-confidence about continued linear progress, the development of scientific
and technical knowledge, the expansion of production, the rational design of
social order, the growing satisfaction of human needs, and, not least, an in-
creasing control over nature (including human nature) commensurate with
scientific understanding of natural laws.” (Scott 1998:89-90)
This idea of the continued linear progress seems to demarcate much of the government’s
stance on the relationship to the natural environment. Forests, for instance, have tremen-
28See Transparency International (2010)
29For a small selection of reports, see for instance Global Witness 2009, CHRAC 2009 & 2010, FIDH
2011, IPNN 2010, Wessendorff 2011, Amnesty International 2011.
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dous value to the Bunong, as we have seen, in a variety of ways, but to the government and
its projects and ambitions directed towards a linear increase of production, it is merely
unused space or untapped resources. By harnessing these resources (i. e. by allowing
the planting or rows of rubber trees on what was once forest), the state is incorporating
what was once marginal space into its controlled territory, and with it exercising more
control on a population that has previously been somewhat elusive to the state-formation
projects30. This population is then expected to adapt to the new economics that are
introduced together with the harnessing of nature, and as such are expected not to farm
for subsistence anymore, but rather take day labor on a plantation that exports produce
to the international markets. It is important to note on this point that this situation is
not exclusive to the previously remote areas of the northeast - the expropriation of com-
munities with basis in dubiously granted concessions is a problem of national magnitude,
and affects communities in all corners of the country (CHRAC 2009 & 2010). What can
be seen as a general tendency, however, is that with the increased accessibility to the
resources in the northeast, and the vastness of the untapped resources in an area with the
country’s lowest population density (4 persons per square kilometer, GPC 2008), these
processes are happening at an accelerated rate, mainly because the “opening up” for ex-
ploitation of resources has been happening at a relatively quick pace, while vast areas
are seen as “unpopulated forestland” and as such are quickly slated for development as
there are no human needs to consider. As we have seen, however, this is not the case.
Vast areas of forestland has been utilized by the indigenous groups for centuries (see for
instance Bourdier 2006, Nikles 2006, Bourdier (ed.) 2009, CKS 2009), but as the pressure
of migration and resettlement of lowlanders on these groups has been relatively minor, the
areas have not been overcrowding. As the state increases its control over natural resources
in these areas, the land available to the minority groups is becoming increasingly scarce.
Furthering the problem is the fact that while the country has legislation for both in-
digenous rights, a land law that allows the claim of ownership of land that has been used
uncontested for five years, and the possibility of getting recognized ownership over com-
munal lands (IPNN 2010), these rights are either overlooked when it comes to granting
30For a more extensive discussion on this, see Scott (1998), Scott (2009), and, for a Cambodian example
in the context of colonialism, Guerin (2009).
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concessions (FIDH 2011), or the process of registration of either private or communal land
made inaccessible to villagers, as they are in no way predisposed to manage a complex
bureaucratic process of forms and official language, all written in a language they often
cannot read and in many cases cannot speak. By this undermining of the existing legis-
lature, the state effectively hinders any but the most basic intrusion into their planned
expansion of agroindustrialization on the lands of the indigenous groups.
With the inclusion of the indigenous communities as paid workforce instead of subsis-
tence farmers, the food security which has been present in their communities for centuries
is eroding (Ironside 2009). The production of cash crops is increasing, and this, coupled
with Cambodia’s entry into the WTO, means that recent subsistence farmers are now
competing with long-standing cash crop producers in the region that have established
themselves within a trade that the indigenous groups are only beginning to enter (Iron-
side 2009). It seems that the change of agricultural preference is finally coming to the
margins of Cambodia via these mechanisms, and, as such, an era of opposing this change is
coming to an end. As Guerin (2009) states regarding the attempts to get the highlanders
to change their agricultural ways under colonial rule:
“The successive Re´sidents of Stung Treng did not stop complaining about the
reluctance of the highland farmers to adopt agricultural techniques that the
French officials believed to be more productive. The swidden cultivators of
Stung Treng and Moulapoumok did not change their agricultural techniques
because, contrary to what the French and Khmer leaders thought, it was not
in their best interest to do so.” (Guerin 2009:136)
Whether it is in their interest or not, this change is now, by the enabling powers of the
state, being forced upon many of these groups. This is what is happening in Bousraa
with the establishment of the rubber plantations there, and this is the context in which
the rest of this chapter is placed.
3.2 The Case at Hand: Socfin KCD in Bousraa
A note on case selection: At the time of fieldwork, there were at least two rubber compa-
nies in Bousraa, one Vietnamese and the Socfin KCD joint venture, in different stages of
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implementation31. The reason for focusing on the Socfin KCD concession(s) is that this
was by far the one that was discussed the most in the community, it was the concession
with which there was the most trouble associated, and it was the concession that had re-
ceived the most (mainly negative) press coverage and NGO interest. Based on this, and
to narrow down my scope, the focus on Socfin KCD and, mainly, “Varanasi” was chosen.
The concession for the “Varanasi” plantation was granted to KCD in 2008. Socfin and
KCD created a joint venture project for the exploitation of this concession that same
year, working together as Socfin KCD. The concession was granted for 70 years (FIDH
2011). Socfin KCD currently administers at least two concessions in the Bousraa area, the
aforementioned “Varanasi”, and the newer concession “Sethicula”. The size of the con-
cessions at the time of writing is estimated at 4273 hectares (Sethicula) and 2705 hectares
(Varanasi), for a grand total of 6978 hectares. In addition there are several other conces-
sions in the area, both for additional rubber plantations and for mineral ventures (FIDH
2011, see the cadastral map). Getting clear information about the concessions granted in
Mondulkiri is a bit confusing, as numbers seem to vary quite a lot, as well as there being
no definitive record kept of them (FIDH 2011). This was reflected in interviews done
in Bousraa - many villagers reported different sizes, locations and company names when
interviewed. There was talk of a third concession, but this has not yet materialized.
Socfin KCD is owned by Socfinasia (80%, administrative responsibility) and KCD (Khao
Chuly Development) (20%). Socfinasia is an investment vehicle registered in Luxembourg
that primarily engages in managing the portfolios of large amounts of rubber and palm
oil plantations in Southeast Asia (FIDH 2011). The company is again owned by Socfin,
a company that dates back to 190932, and that has a somewhat tattered record of hu-
man rights abuses on their plantations (FIDH 2011). Socfin is owned, in part, by the
Bollore´ group of France, and by Belgian families Fabri and de Ribes, with the Fabri fam-
ilies having ties to millions of hectares of plantations in Africa and Asia (FIDH 2011).
The plantations in Bousraa under the management of Socfin KCD are, as such, parts
of a larger empire of multinational companies that administer massive amounts of simi-
31See FIDH 2011, which lists Dak Lak Mondolkiri Aphivatch Caoutchouc Co. LTD (5108 ha.) granted
to Dak Lak Limited Rubber Company, in addition to the two Socfin KCD concessions.
32Socfin website: http://www.socfin.com/
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lar plantations, some with dubious reputations. The “History” section of Socfin’s website
(http://www.socfin.com/) goes as far back as 1890, when Adrian Hallet goes to the Congo
for King Leopold II of Belgium. While it may be unfair to draw the practice of rubber
exploitation in Belgian Congo into the equation of Bousraa, it is interesting to see how
a rubber empire that grew on the shoulders of a massive colonial exploit that killed an
enormous amount of people have now found it’s way into northeastern Cambodia. KCD
is a Cambodian entrepreneurial firm with strong links to the Cambodian government (Mr.
Khao Chuly himself is a private adviser to prime minister Hun Sen (ADB 2009)).
A brief timeline of the events that led up to the unrest in Bousraa is in order here33.
After having founded the joint venture, Socfin KCD started clearing land for the plan-
tation in April 2008. This was met by protests from villagers in May, which led to
Socfin KCD agreeing to compensate villagers affected by clearings. Reports of threats
are voiced in the community. On the 8th of October 2008 the contract for Varanasi is
officially signed. The same month community representatives file a complaint regarding
the concession to the Council of Ministers, the Prime Minister’s Office, the Ministry of
Agriculture, Forestry and Fisheries, the Ministry of Interior, and the Ministry of Land
Management, Urban Planning and Construction. To date, no reply has been given to this
complaint. In December negotiations start, but no agreement was reached. On the 20th
of December 2008, 400 Bunong rally against the company, destroying seedlings, burning
and destroying excavators. The army intervenes. January of 2009 sees six community
representatives arrested without charges. They are told that they will be arrested again
if they talk to the media or NGOs. In February 2009 a sacred forest is bulldozed. Socfin
takes over operational management at this point. In May and September of 2009 clearing
continues, and the first planting commences. In December 2009 Socfin halts clearing for
three months to conduct negotiations. Throughout 2010 more reports about razed sacred
forests and burial forests are submitted. On the 21st of January 2010, a group of NGO
representatives are denied access to the plantations. Meetings between villagers and com-
33FIDH (2011) has a timeline of the events in Bousraa, which is more or less condensed and adapted
here. The FIDH report is the most accurate and well-researched report on the Bousraa case I have seen
to date, and it is as such quoted extensively. The FIDH mission group have also conducted extensive
interviews with high-level plantation employees, something which I have not. The report is, as such, a
brilliant source of information for practical details concerning the plantations in Bousraa.
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pany continue in March, with no further progress. In March and April the contract for
Sethicula is finalized. In late 2010, several of Socfin’s expatriate staff is replaced, and
Socfin establishes an office to focus on relations to the local community. They hire Mr.
Sylvain Vogel, an expert on Bunong language, to head this office, which includes Bunong
staff. The clearing of land continues. Some cases of razed sacred or burial forest are
resolved by Socfin paying for ceremonies to make amends to the spirits.
The above synopsis, the peculiarities of which will be addressed later, already shows some
general traits of the process this project was created in. A company with government ties
is given a concession, this company then teams up with foreign capital and expertise, and
exploitation of resources commences. The complaints made by the community are at first
silenced, then attempted dealt with efficiently. The resistance to the project still goes on
to this day, with no clear, uniform solution in sight. In the following paragraphs some
comparisons in the different modes of production will be undertaken, and the peculiarities
of the process concerning the plantations in Bousraa will be examined. Furthermore, the
outline of the consequences the implementation has on the community is presented.
Rubber farming is agroindustrialization at its finest. The process of establishing a rubber
plantation begins with clearing the land for any trees that are present on it, before digging
holes and planting rubber saplings. These saplings are planted in straight rows, normally
with a 2-3 meter gap between them34. For the first two to three years it is possible to grow
mixed crops between the rows of rubber trees, but when the canopy closes over the rows,
it is, in all practical respects, a monoculture. The rows are tended for approximately 5-7
years, when they are mature and ready to produce. Production consists of making small
incisions in the bark of the trees, which causes the rubber to “bleed” out of the tree. This
rubber is collected in a cup near the base of the tree, which is emptied every other or
third day. New incisions are made, and the process repeated. The most common rubber
trees have a lifespan of approximately 32 years, with approximately 25 of these being
productive years. The rubber is processed, dried and finally sold on the international
market. As one can grasp from this very brief account of what farming rubber entails,
it is far removed from the crops of the average swiddener. The fields are enormous, and
34The particulars of rubber planting are sourced from Socfin’s website (http://www.socfin.com)
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look almost military in their precision - the set distance between trees, the “corridors”
that are formed between the rows. It is a massive reshaping of nature. Scott terms this
“scientific forestry” (1998, chapter 1). Rubber plantations are not known to deplete soil
or promote erosion, but by being monocultures they seriously curb biodiversity where
they are implemented.
Swidden agriculture, on the other hand, is, as we have seen, a mode of production geared
towards variety and stability for the sake of security. It is regarded as sustainable35 given
that population pressure is not an issue (Bourdier 2006, Nikles 2006 etc.). The resin
tapping of the Bunong is also deemed to be sustainable by Baird (2010):
“This study indicates that Dipterocarpus wood resin trees are among the
most resilient NTFP resources in mainland Southeast Asia, and that their
commercial use in Teun Commune is not particularly problematic in relation
to the long term sustainability of the resource.” (2010:1040)
The reshaping of nature into a monoculture, and the loss of farmland and subsistence
security are in and of themselves incompatible with the Bunong’s relationship to nature.
Add to that the bulldozing of graveyard sites and sacred forests, and serious issues start
appearing. A few issues regarding the implementation of the plantation will be discussed
hereafter.
First of all, let’s investigate the question of ownership to the land. According to the
Cambodian Land Law, anyone utilizing a piece of land can make a claim for legal owner-
ship as long as the claim is not contested (FIDH 2011 quoting the Land Law (2001)). As
the indigenous groups of Cambodia do not have a tradition for private land titles (Bour-
dier 2009, White 1996, FIDH 2011), the most likely way to ensure tenure is by applying
for a communal land title. This is, however, a complicated bureaucratic process, and a
process which takes time and money (FIDH 2011). The first communal land title ever
was granted in 2010 (Wessendorf 2011:297), and there is, as such, no standing tradition
for making it through this process and securing tenure rights to a community’s farmlands.
35The impact on climate due to the large amounts of carbon emissions from swiddening on a world
basis is an issue, as is the erosion and depletion concerns connected with increased population pressure
which causes longer farm times on each plot of land and shorter fallow times.
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In Bousraa, the concession for Varanasi was granted before the villagers could send their
application, and so the land, at the time of implementation, was classified as state land.
Two interesting comments to this is that: 1. FIDH states that there is no record of the
concession land in Bousraa being transferred to the status of private land and 2. That
the concession for Sethicula is not legally termed a concession - it is termed a lease, as
large amounts of the concession is, in fact, situated within the Phnom Nam Lia Wildlife
Sanctuary. In other words: the legislative powers of the state are obviously in favor of the
project being implemented. Several villagers in Bousraa reported that the government
claimed it “didn’t know” that the land was being used by approximately 850 families
(FIDH 2011, informants). By the simple fact that there is a local administration present,
this is simply untrue. Anyone that has ever traveled to Bousraa has seen the fields of
the village. They have been very much visible, and there have been roads and tracks
connecting them to the village proper.
The project is, then, as FIDH also concludes, riddled with irregularities on a legisla-
tive level. When it comes to how the project was presented and “sold” to villagers, there
are also several issues. First, there is the case of what was going on before clearing started.
Many informants reported that representatives from the company (they did not identify
themselves as that at the time) made a tour of the Bousraa villages, going to peoples
houses and asking if people “wanted development”. Having their own conception of what
this would entail, most villagers said yes. Villagers assumed that these were people from
an NGO or similar that had come do see what they could do to help the community.
Informants said they had given a new or improved school, a better road to Sen Monorom
and an improved health station as their main wishes, was the area to be “developed”.
There was at this point no talk of clearing land, of any economic land concessions, or of
the reshaping of farmland and forest into plantation land. The villagers had no impression
that answering positive to the question of “wanting development” would imply anything
at all - except perhaps the chance for improved infrastructure in the community. This
information has later been used against them when the complaints have surfaced, in the
form of Khmer employees of Socfin KCD blaming villagers for “going back” on what they
said to this round of questions:
“At first they came, asking us if we wanted development. We said yes, we
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want development. The road to Sen Monorom is not very good, especially in
the wet season. The schools are in bad shape, and we’d like a health station
we can go to. We said all these things. Later, when we complained about the
forest being cut, the Khmer workers told us “It’s your own fault! You said
you wanted development!”” - Informant in Bousraa 1
It already becomes clear that there is a divide between villagers’ understanding of the
term development and the (in this case) Khmer workers’ understanding of the same.
Where the Bunong assume that development is mainly about improving existing condi-
tions in terms of health, education and infrastructure, the Khmer workers in this example
have expressed it as something that does not come for free. Development in their under-
standing of the word is something that you pay for, such as in the current example: Do
you want development? We’ll take your land, then. It belongs to this story that Socfin
KCD has put money into refurbishing two schools in Bousraa, have set aside money for
teacher’s salaries, and had, at the time of writing, equipped a health station that had not
yet opened, but supposedly would soon, and that would be prioritizing Bunong patients.
The road is still not impressive, but I assume it reasonable to believe that it will be im-
proved once the plantations start producing in a few years. The amount of money spent
by Socfin KCD on community programs is not currently known (FIDH 2011). What all
informants agreed on, though, is that they would rather have kept their land than lose it.
While several informants thought of the plantations as opportunity, they agreed that it
did not come about in a fair and free manner. The discussions with the community were
non-existent, and the respect for the wishes of community members the same. Villagers
are not inflexible - there exists a plethora of views on how this could and should have
been solved, what has come of it and what will come of it - but first and foremost there
is a general feeling of distrust towards the company that took their land without their
consent, and with no regard for the already existing demarcations of the community on
it, in terms of burial grounds, sacred forests, fallow land and farmland. This has caused
a great deal of chaos in regards to compensations, which will be discussed later.
When it comes to the implementation itself, villagers reported that it started without
any form of dialogue or consent. As mentioned in the timeline of events, the complaints
from the community materialized shortly after the first clearing was started, but were of
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no consequence to the continued clearing of farmland and forests near Bousraa. While
there was talk of compensation, there was also talk about threats. Informants reported
that they were asked if they “were troublemakers”, and if they were willing to “pay the
price for being a troublemaker”. As the clearing went on, the company offered the villagers
affected by the first clearing three options. They could receive monetary compensation for
their land at $200 per hectare, they could receive a parcel of land within the plantation
to grow rubber trees on, or they could receive a new plot of land to keep farming. When
interviews were undertaken, many informants had taken monetary compensation, as they
saw their land disappear, and felt that it was the only way to at least be left with some-
thing. They also did not believe that the company would provide them with land, or had
not received a clear reply from the company regarding where the land would be located.
The informants that had said they wanted a new plot of land elsewhere had still not been
granted land, and so had no plot of land to farm. This, of course, is a huge problem, as it
erodes all means of subsistence for the farmers that are determined to remain farmers and
forces them to seek alternate sources of income - in the case of Bousraa this more often
than not entailed getting day labor at the plantation, on the land they once farmed. None
of the interviewed villagers for this study had agreed to farm rubber. Several informants
were talking about “going to the forest”. This meant leaving Bousraa, going to a remote
area and making a farm there. In a situation where, for many people, the only option
for ensuring food on the table was to take day labor on the plantation, this seemed like a
better option. It is unclear whether this happened at all - no informants reported going
looking for land, for instance - but the topic surfaced in many conversations, often with
those who had agreed to monetary compensation, as they would need a more permanent
food security solution.
In the end, many of my informants reported having taken money due to a lack of real
choice. Distrust towards the company after several issues had surfaced, coupled with the
fact that clearing had started without villagers’ consent were mentioned as main factors -
in general the impression made by the company on the various members of the community
was nothing short of disastrous.
What becomes apparent after investigating how the plantation was implemented, the lack
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of dialogue and the disregard for villagers’ wishes, coupled with the villagers’ traditional
relationship to their land, is that the two views presented are completely incompatible.
The Varanasi project is, from its outset, at a collision course with the subsistence ethic
of the inhabitants of Bousraa, and with the moral economy that this ethic is based upon.
As an overarching scheme, we can see that by detaching land from villagers, they get
forced into wage labor on the plantation, having to take what compensation they could
get to somehow cover parts of their losses. Remembering Scott (1998), this can be seen
as part of a state-formation project where the government, by way of an economic land
concession, are extending their population control into new realms, all under the guise of
“development” - the rhetoric suggests a view of the indigenous groups of the northeast as
poor savages in need of help to escape poverty.
In addition to changing the subsistence basis for the community in Bousraa, the project
had other consequences for the population, one of them being the generation of difference
within the community. As the clearing went on, villagers reported that some of them lost
their farmland fairly quickly - for some this also included the fallow land, while others
did not lose all of it, and yet others have hardly lost anything. This skews the generation
of produce in the favor of those that were not heavily affected by the first clearing on the
concession. Villagers reported helping those that still had farmlands with their harvest
in return for a cut of the produce or for day wages, while having to take day labor on
the plantation remained the only option for continuity. As production of foodstuffs went
down, more and more villagers saw themselves having to buy food they would normally
have produced themselves, such as rice. It seems reasonable to assume that over time,
with more and more farmland disappearing, the food vendors in Bousraa will have good
days. A speculation can be made into whether the food prices will also escalate with di-
minishing local availability, something many villagers feared. It is pertinent to note here
that many of the shops and stalls in Bousraa are owned by Khmers - another factor that
is important regarding the further development of class in Bousraa: it seems obvious that
the tendency goes towards generating a new lower class of day-laborers with no means of
self-subsistence, whose money are spent in the shops of the Khmer population, thus trans-
ferring the bulk of wealth generated from working the plantations from the Bunong to the
Khmers. Remembering the definition of development as “the relationship between rich
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and poor countries (with an emphasis on the commitment of the rich to help the poor be-
come rich)” (Hart/Padayachee 2010:52), we see that something is not sitting right. In the
case of Bousraa, the underprivileged are being transformed from independent subsistence
farmers to wage laborers with little or no option of accumulating capital - or, “becoming
rich”, so to say. With a basis in this, it becomes clear that “development” is not a term
that is quantifiable in the current context in any meaningful way. The population does
not, per se, see a net gain or increase in their standard of living: it presents itself as more
of a trade-off, where the losses may or may not outweigh the gains. Considering again the
relationship to land already inherent in the community, the scales seem to tip towards a
loss. This notion is discussed later in this chapter.
The problems that are present in Bousraa, then, can be seen as directly related to the
system already in place in the villages before the plantations, and the strain put on this
system by an external actor working under government acceptance. The incorporation of
the Bunong into the market economy and the extended state control, with no real choice
for the inhabitants, does not work, and does not contribute to the “development” of the
population of Bousraa. The adaptability of the Bunong to the new structure is also not
perfect: from being self-supplied, working a farm in a rhythm that is well-known, to being
a “cog in the capitalist machinery” provides a new set of challenges. Many Bunong have
lost their jobs at the plantation, or not been able to secure one in the first place due
to a lack of paperwork (also discussed below). This has led to a large influx of migrant
workers in Bousraa. In May of 2010 we witnessed trucks upon trucks upon trucks of
Khmers coming to the villages to participate in the planting of a new clearing. FIDH
(2011) notes that two thirds of the workforce of Socfin KCD is Khmer, but that they are
“taking measures” to encourage and ensure employment for the Bunong. At the time of
fieldwork many villagers expressed frustration that they were losing their last option, as
they couldn’t even work on the plantations. Bousraa’s population is bloating with these
migrant workers, which is also putting added pressure on the original population.
Having looked into the practicalities of the plantation establishment and some conse-
quences and concerns relating to it, it is time to move on to the villagers themselves. The
next section deals with their responses and reactions to being involuntarily entangled in a
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this large-scale economic development project, and their thoughts on what development
should be.
3.3 Villagers on Development
““Talk about development...”, Pal commented. “It is development for the
company, not for the villagers since they no longer have any land...”” - IPNN
(2010)
“There is a policy to support indigenous peoples, but we are asking them
to change their traditions. They need to settle down and stop being nomad
otherwise they won’t get out of poverty” - Mr. Kin Chean, Deputy Director,
Agriculture Department Mondulkiri Province to FIDH (2011).
“According to the authorities, villagers will benefit from the company, getting
new jobs, hospitals, schools and houses for rubber workers.“ - WRM (2009)
“Recently, the Agence franc¸aise de de´veloppement, the French Development
Agency (AFD) has visited the place. They might be interested to support
family rubber plantations around the Socfin KCD concession, and they are
going to ask for a social, economic and environmental impact assessment of the
concession project. None of such assessments has been done before granting
the concession.“ - WRM (2009)
“AFD is a financial institution and is France’s main agency responsible for
official development assistance to developing countries. Socfin KCD contem-
plated obtaining a 2,5 million euros loan for a project of rubber family planta-
tion and garden wood in Bousraa, which subsequently triggered the conduct
of an environmental and social impact assessment to comply with AFD’s re-
quirements. Socfin KCD finalized the ESIA in September 2010 and without
providing reasons to AFD or FIDH, abandoned the project in 2011.” FIDH
(2011)
““It [development] is inevitable.... If we were not here, it would be the Viet-
namese, and then for the Phnong it would be the end,” he said.” - PPP
(2009), quoting Phillippe Monnin (then General Manager at Socfin KCD).
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The above quotes illustrate the span in meaning connected to the term development, and
how it is presented. The villager in the first quote is disillusioned, finding that devel-
opment does not benefit his community, but rather benefits a large company that has
encroached on the land him and his family have been farming for as long as he can re-
member. The second quote illustrates that local authorities have adapted a view on the
Bunong as poor people that need to “develop” to get out of the rut they are in. The
two quotes regarding AFD are interesting in terms of being related to one of the larger
international “development agencies”. The AFD approach to family-scale rubber opera-
tions was abandoned, and the report written with the aim to investigate the feasibility of
such a model is, to my knowledge, not publicly available. In the last quote, the stance of
Socfin KCD itself is documented: “development” is inevitable.
Let us see, then, what the villagers themselves, the subject of this development, have
to say about it. First and foremost, in the aftermath of clearing forests without dis-
cussing this with villagers, after bulldozing a graveyard site, and after cutting down sacred
forests, all the villagers interviewed for this study agreed on one thing: this is not devel-
opment. The attitudes towards the project vary quite significantly, but the general idea
that development is supposed to be something positive, is a notion shared by all. When
interviewed about development, villagers stated that there were several things they would
like to improve in their community. Infrastructure, education and health were always the
main issues in these discussions, and, indeed, some of these things have been somewhat
improved after Socfin KCD came to town. However, this is not worth much when the
price to pay is the loss of independent food production, the disturbance and angering of
spirits, and having to work as day laborers on a plantation that is situated on land they
would have chosen to keep, had they been given a choice in the first place.
When it comes to the choices, they are in fact not real choices, as shown above. The
relocation plan is not yet functional, and people were left without land to farm, which is
not acceptable by any standards. As one Bunong woman put it:
“They asked us, “Do you want schools? A hospital? A new road to Sen
Monorom?” Of course we do! But now they come here with their bulldozers,
saying that this is progress, this is development, this is how we have to do
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it if you want all these new things. I don’t believe them! We have to find
a different way, or they have to start respecting us. They treat us like we
are lower than dogs, like our opinions do not matter, like we don’t deserve
a say in what happens to our land, because we are not intelligent enough to
know our own good. What I know is this: we used to be able to feed our
family with what we grew on our mirrs, and we could make extra money by
collecting resin and honey from the forest. Now we only have two miirs left,
and we have used one of them for two years already. We have to leave it now,
or it will never regrow. How is this development? If i cannot eat, I don’t care
about roads and schools!” - Informant in village 1.
A lot of emphasis was put on the feeling of having been used or conned by the people
asking them if they wanted development. Villagers perceived it as completely unfair that
they should have known what would happen if they answered “yes” to wanting develop-
ment. While none of my informants reported having been tricked into selling land via
thumb-printing36 a blank document, other reports mention this taking place (CHRAC
2010), which has surely increased the skepticism towards the company.
When it comes to taking work at the plantation, the villagers are also quite uniform
in their condemnation of the methods used by the company, speaking of difficult condi-
tions, of unbearable hours, and of the difficulty of keeping a job there should you want
to:
“I’ve been working at the plantation for a while, but it’s not easy. I have to
get up very early to get ready to work, as the company trucks pick us up at
4am, even if we don’t start work until 7am. If I’m not ready at that time,
I’m not allowed into work that day, and will not get paid. If you miss a day
of work, maybe you cannot work for a while, because they will find someone
else.” - Informant in village 2.
The trucks pick the workers up at 4am, and transport them to the plantation area for
registration, before work commences at 7am. The trucks are huge, and the flatbeds are
36A thumbprint is a common form of signature in Cambodia, as there are still many illiterates. Most
official documents, including those that verify the sale of a piece of land, have to be thumb-printed to be
legally acceptable.
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literally crammed full of people. The workdays are long and heavy, and are described as
“very different” from farming on the mirrs, especially in terms of workload. There are
daily goals to be met if workers want to ensure their continued engagement to the company.
What villagers have suggested be done otherwise in this process is of some significance.
First and foremost, the massive lack of communication is always a topic. The villagers
are used to managing their own affairs, and are having trouble accepting that they should
not be allowed involvement in something as crucial as the restructuring of their entire
livelihood system. The Socfin KCD representatives are seen as disrespectful, as they did
not at any point try to engage villagers in discussion, or even attempt to explain what the
implementation of Varanasi would mean for them. This is also often the explanation that
comes up first when discussing the outrage towards the plantation (discussed in the next
chapter). Villagers see the land as theirs (rightly so from a purely legislative standpoint),
and are not going to let it go without a fight. In addition to wanting involvement in
the crucial stages of planning for the projects that will affect them, villagers wanted the
company to respect their traditions. While many reported that it was mainly the Khmer
staff that were cutting down sacred forests and burial grounds, an interesting example is
mentioned in FIDH (2011):
“However, since the land clearing is done by a subcontractor who is appar-
ently unaware of the demarcation process, incidents occurring in spiritual and
burial forests continued to be reported even after numerous complaints by the
communities and CSOs. When asked by FIDH why this was still occurring,
the company responded that the subcontractor, a Cambodian company, did
not take into consideration the map indicating the areas to avoid since they
“didnt´ care”.”
As the communication within the different branches of the operation seem to be as lack-
ing as the external communication, it is perhaps no surprise that forest that should be
saved, is cut. It is, however, obvious that villagers will hold responsibility for this on the
company as a whole - the fact that a subcontractor is doing it because the subcontractor
“doesn’t care” is not much of an excuse.
Furthermore, the villagers interviewed are disappointed that replacement land has not
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materialized, leaving many without any source of food for themselves. This was another
reason many villagers gave for the increased mistrust towards the company over time. As
many of the inhabitants of Bousraa would like to keep their subsistence model as it is (even
if it means travel further from Bousraa to the fields), this is unacceptable, and is seen as
trying to force them into working on the plantations. Another important point villagers
mentioned was that since the company started clearing forest without consulting villagers,
they had cleared forest which should not have been cleared. This included graveyard and
sacred forest, and has put the community at mercy of the spirits’ wrath. Many villagers
reported feeling sick as they could not make amends to the spirits, and they feared that
they would now be so angered that they could never make amends. This is problematic
in several ways, as the appeasing of the spirits costs a great deal of money in terms of
livestock and wine. Informants reported that they did not have any opportunity to make
the appropriate sacrifices for such massive insults, and so were left in a state of peril. The
discussions with Socfin KCD went on for some time about this, and the outcome was that
Socfin KCD agreed to pay for some ceremonies related to the clearing of burial forest.
In April 2010 the first of these ceremonies (as reported by informants) took place, with
Socfin KCD representatives present. The village chief at that point expressed relief that
the situation was resolved, even if the terms were not as good as he had hoped for. In the
end he seemed happy that at least the villagers had made a large company with massive
amounts of money bow down to their tradition, and he was pleased that two foreigners
representing the company took part in the ceremony, even if they were “very shy and
stood far away”. Like the others, he took what he could get.
All in all, there is a distinct feeling that things have not in any way been fair. Vil-
lagers that see themselves as capable decision-makers are reduced to pawns in a game of
agrobusiness, and this has led to the situation in Bousraa being as it is now, with a deep
distrust between original population, the development company, and the local authorities.
As one woman expressed it: “We will be poor, and we will lose our culture. Bousraa is
turning into a Khmer village now” (Informant in Village 1).
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3.4 ”Development” and the Bunong
Judging by the previous sections, it becomes clear that development is not something
that the villagers in Bousraa, the local authorities and Socfin KCD agree upon. While
villagers see it as something that they should be actively involved in, and something that
will expand upon what they already have while improving conditions, the local authorities
(and, by proxy, the Cambodian government) see villagers as poor, savage, and in need of
incorporation into the market economy of the country. As in the quote by the Agricul-
tural Department’s Deputy Director, the Bunong are asked to change their traditions to
move out of poverty. For the state, it seems, development and tradition are incompatible.
Villagers do not feel this way. In the case of Socfin KCD, development is “inevitable”, and
if it does not happen at the hand of Socfin KCD, someone else will “develop” the Bunong.
The problem with this sort of argument is, of course, that the means are not justified by
the existence of another, perceived worse, alternative37. Socfin KCD are reported to have
described the working conditions as something the villagers will have to “get used to”
(FIDH 2011), and have complained about “discipline issues” (FIDH 2011). The discipline
issues are most likely related to the fact that plantation work is not something villagers
asked for, wanted, or even want now that it’s there - the majority of people interviewed
in Bousraa still report that they ideally want their land back, or another piece of land to
farm the way they used to.
What we see, then, is that the development project in Bousraa is, in many respects,
an attempt at conforming subsistence farmers to a linear material idea of development,
where waged labor is the norm and the ideal, while subsistence farming over large amounts
of land is seen as a prehistoric practice that has no place in modern society. The villagers,
having their basis in the subsistence ethic, are not interested in this change, as it pene-
trates deep into their societal structure. As described in the chapter about moral economy,
the relationship between the Bunong and their land is not simply one of means of produc-
tion, it is a social good which the society relies upon for a variety of important functions.
37It is interesting to note at this point that many villagers had more positive views on the Vietnamese
companies that Mr. Monnin refers to in his quote. The Vietnamese have made some effort to spare the
sacred and burial forests, and have, as such, not experienced the same outrage towards their operations
as Socfin KCD. This being said, the issue of villagers having to change their subsistence basis is very
much the same in the areas developed by the Vietnamese company.
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By developing the control if this good away from the Bunong, one is not offering them
opportunity, but deprivation. What this means in practice is that the Bunong are left
with less than what they had before being “developed” - contrary to any general idea of
development, which would entail increasing opportunity, infrastructure and (the potential
for) material wealth. “Development” loses it’s meaning as a concept when one tries to
apply it to the situation in Bousraa, simply because the main three actors involved in
it have different meanings of what it should constitute. What we see from the villagers
is an idea of development that is probably the closest to what we would like it to be,
looking from north to south. And if we view the concept from the angle of company and
state, we see nothing but profit-maximizing, with very little concern for the subjects to
be developed. It is a paradox, then, that the group of people that are to be developed,
and that supposedly need development, are the very same people that rigorously resist
development in the form it has taken in Bousraa. What we see is that capitalism is being
sold as development - the real benefactors of the agroindustrialization of Bousraa are the
shareholders of Socfin and KCD. There is a need to rethink development in light of this if
any meaning is going to be placed on the term development - if not it is not meaningful for
either group, and results in development for company and state, but not for the recipients
of these policies, that are used as an excuse for implementation.
It seems relevant at this point to return to Ferguson’s “farmers” in Lesotho, as the parallel
is striking:
“When a project is sent out to “develop the farmers” and finds that “the
farmers” are not much interested in farming, and, in fact, do not even consider
themselves to be “farmers”, it is thus easy for it to arrive at the conclusion
that “the people” are mistaken, that they really are farmers and that they
need only to be convinced that this is so for it to be so.” (1994:178)
The inhabitants of Bousraa are in this case being treated as something they are not, and
do not want to be: wage laborers. Contrasting ideas of development and what it consti-
tutes leads the government and developers to label them as “wrong”: that they do not
know their own good, and need to become wage laborers so as to “get out of poverty”.
They need only to be convinced that this is so.
69
To close this section off, a quote from Bourdier is appropriate:
“It is not difficult to assume that if peoples of the highlands continue to pro-
tect their trees and their physical environment, this is not merely because
the forest is perceived as having magical and charming qualities and values,
but because it provides them with something important and meaningful. Any
development intervention that is not based on the comprehension of this sen-
sitive interaction between the population and their immediate environment is,
ultimately, misled and farcical.” (2009:46)
As have been demonstrated, the “development intervention” in Bousraa has been, in
Bourdier’s words “misled and farcical”. As a result of this, villagers have, throughout the
process, resisted the implementation of the project, and on one occasion even taken violent
action against the company. As demonstrated, this is linked to the subsistence ethic, and
to land as a social good in Bunong community. The incorporation into market economy
and wage labor is not compatible with these factors, and so the moral indignation rose to
a climax in the period after the commencement of clearing trees around Bousraa, while
also being escalated by continuous “mishaps” by the company. In the next chapter the
resistance towards the plantation is examined.
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Figure 7: Playing the gongs and tapping jar wine. Wedding in Village 1.
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4 Resistance
Figure 8: ”NO ENTRY” (in Khmer) carved into a tree - the forest has been privatized.
Figure 9: The clearing continues. ”Varanasi”, February 2010.
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Having seen from the two preceding chapters that the Bunong have their subsistence
ethic challenged by a large-scale economic development project on what used to be their
farmlands, their sacred forests and their burial sites, it is time to move on to their resis-
tance to this project. It becomes clear that the collision between market and subsistence
economies, coupled with the moral indignation from the removal of access to a social good
is what causes the outrage that will be described here. The first part of the chapter re-
gards Scott’s (1990) idea of public and hidden transcripts. I’ll show what these transcripts
consist of, what differentiates them, and what actions are planned in the communication.
Resistance met by myself while doing fieldwork is also discussed. Furthermore, the chap-
ter looks into the different types of violations that have taken place in the case of the
establishment of Varanasi, and how these actions constitute the basis for resistance. In
the next section, acts of sabotage are discussed, both physical and spiritual, and how they
are planned, instigated and carried out. The revolt against the company, resulting in de-
stroyed equipment and saplings is discussed after this, and the aftermath of the incident
is considered. The two final sections deal with what these acts of resistance mean, what
made them come about, and linking this to the other focal points of this thesis, moral
economy and development.
4.1 Public and Hidden Transcripts
Remembering Scott’s definition of public transcripts (“open interaction between subor-
dinate and those who dominate” (1990:2)), we can establish a public transcript for the
context of Bousraa. The subordinates in this case are, of course, the Bunong of Bousraa
that have had a rubber plantation implemented on their farmlands. Those who dominate,
conversely, are the representatives of the Cambodian government and of the company and
its interests. The interaction between the two groups is manifold, and has evolved over
time.
In the first instance of public transcript, there is the preliminary survey villagers men-
tioned in interviews, where they were asked if they wanted development. While this can
not be asserted for certain, it is reasonable to assume that this is the 2006 Suitability Sur-
vey conducted by KCD, as mentioned in FIDH (2011). It is included here as part of the
public transcript, as even though the relationships between subordinate and those who
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dominate were not established at this point, villagers still refer to it as part of the commu-
nication between them and the company and government. After the clearing started, the
public transcript proper is established. The first instance is the protest taking place in
May of 2008, where approximately 100 community representatives protested the clearing
by rallying at the Provincial Governors Office. At this point the villagers are promised that
land will be given back to them (FIDH 2011). As there is no progress, the villagers filed
a complaint in October of 2008, which still has not been formally answered. A dialogue
meeting is held in December of 2008 (on the day before villagers violently protested the
plantation), but it does not present any solution. There were more meeting throughout
the following year, but no solution was reached. The dialogue in these meetings, according
to informants, revolved more around trying to explain that the plantation is necessary
and a good thing for the community rather than taking the concerns of villagers seriously,
and so they do not lead anywhere. After Socfin takes over operational management of the
plantation, the meetings are more frequent, but do not lead to meaningful discussions,
according to villagers. When a sacred forest is razed in February of 2009, the attitudes
towards the company are significantly hardened. In an attempt to make communication
more efficient and meaningful, Socfin established a “Tripartite Committee” in December
2009, consisting of three representatives from the company, three representatives from the
local authorities, and three representatives from the local community. Land clearing is
halted for three months, but resumes immediately after this time, and there is still no
solution to villagers’ grievances. The incidents concerning burial sites and sacred forests
continue to happen, and the communication is not improved - villagers reported that the
company seemed if not indifferent, then at least as not having any “will to agreement”.
As the Sethikula concession is finalized, Socfin KCD initiates a meeting with villagers to
ensure “Free and Prior Consent”. As the interviews for this study were done before the
implementation of Sethikula, there is no definite data on how the communication process
for this project was experienced by villagers - there were rumors that sacred forest and
burial sites would be spared once clearing was undertaken, but remembering the example
of subcontractors who “don’t care”, it seems unlikely that the situation will be much
different.
According to villagers, the most common topics for discussion in the meetings were the
75
same things that were described in complaints and protests: compensation, disputes re-
garding the clearing of burial and sacred sites, the accusations toward the Khmer middle-
men in the company, the demarcation of fallow land and the conflicts that result from the
company clearing land without first consulting with villagers. Regarding compensation,
many villagers voiced frustration openly about not being given real choice as to what they
wanted to do with their land. The people who took the money offered had few choices
left but to try to find work at the plantation, while those that agreed to resettlement
plans did not see the new plots materialize, and so stood without land to farm and had
to look elsewhere for securing subsistence. These discussions are still very much alive in
Bousraa - there does not seem to be a lasting solution for the problems until the process
is tidied up significantly. When it comes to the clearing of sacred and burial sites in
the forest, villagers voiced anger openly towards the company and its representatives for
not managing to prevent “accidental” clearings of these sites to happen again and again.
The company representatives have repeatedly stated to villagers that this should not hap-
pen, yet it does. Villagers have also complained, both verbally and in writing, that the
Khmer employees of Socfin KCD do not accurately report what villagers are saying to
the top-level staff of Socfin. These issues particularly revolve around the amount of land
each villager thinks him- or herself entitled to. Accusations of corruption and conscious
manipulation of numbers were rife and in the open. Villagers also complained that they
were not believed when they claimed their fallow land for compensation, and also that
the demarcation of fallow land is made difficult if not impossible when the company clears
large tracts of land without first letting villagers discuss and agree upon the demarcation
and the demarcation process.
A complaint that surfaced several times in interviews and conversations was that the
Khmer employees of Socfin KCD and the “foreigners” working for the same company
were communicating “differently”. While the reputations of the different foreign employ-
ees varied widely, the villagers often had the impression that they were easier to commu-
nicate with than the Khmers. The foreigners (after Socfin took operational management)
were rumored to spend time in the community trying to resolve conflicts regarding the
above issues, and several informants claimed that this was working quite well - until the
agreed-upon solution to a given problem was not in accordance with the dialogue between
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company and community representatives. The Khmer staff was largely blamed for this, as
villagers saw them as the ones that implemented orders from the foreigners, and accused
them of under-reporting land to take money for themselves and such. What we see the
contours of here is a sort of fragmented public transcript, the fact that there is a public and
open communication between company, government and community, but that significant
information is either lost in translation or consciously mis- or under-reported, so that the
public transcript becomes a tangle of information where it is difficult to know what is true
and genuine, and what is being “sold” as the same. This created a great deal of mistrust
in the community, and is frequently discussed in the hidden transcript between villagers,
as shown below.
In assessing this public transcript, a few points are important. First and foremost, the
public transcript is somewhat confusing. The information, and the exchange of informa-
tion, while attempted organized, is not very consistent or constructive. The parties seem
to have taken their stance, and effective and meaningful dialogue has not yet taken place
in any significant way. While the villagers are concerned with being heard and being
involved in the process, the company is more interested in selling them the idea of the
plantation as opportunity. Furthermore, the public transcript seems to revolve around
data that is often erroneous, or claimed erroneous by one of the parties. This is often
the case with fallow land, as villagers claim compensation, then the company accuses
them of “doubling up” on certain pieces of land, or of reporting the same piece of land
for monetary compensation twice, etc. The conflicts in the community also escalate via
this, as inhabitants in different villagers accuse each other of “stealing” land by reporting
and receiving compensation for land that is not rightfully theirs. An important thing to
note here is that Socfin KCD has insisted that compensation claims be made individually,
a system of tenure that is not directly compatible with more communal notions of land
ownership in Bunong villages. Finally, it is significant that much of the hidden transcript
revolves around how the public transcript is not meaningful.
When it comes to the hidden transcript, Scott describes them as “tak[ing] place “off-
stage”, beyond direct observation by power holders”. In the context of Bousraa, this
constitutes conversations between villagers, unofficial and official meetings between them,
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in short any form of communication in which villagers are involved and topics regarding
the plantation are being discussed. Another issue that can be considered part of the hid-
den transcript is the alleged threats against villagers by company employees in connection
to the first discussions concerning compensation. Several villagers reported company em-
ployees saying they should take what they could get, or they would just take the land
without giving them anything, for instance. Threats and accusations, from both parties,
then, constitute a significant part of the hidden transcript, as well as the planning of acts
of resistance, as will be shown below. I have had no formal dealings with company em-
ployees save for a few encounters with the Khmer staff, and have as such not been privy
to the company representatives’ hidden transcript. When it comes to the villagers and
their hidden transcript, it is hard to go beyond what has been said to me personally in
conversation with inhabitants of Bousraa, as I have no definite way to establish how this
transcript has taken place in the past or how it has evolved. It should also be noted that
it has been difficult for me to assert how deep into the hidden transcript I ever managed
to dive (see below).
What is obvious is that the tone and the accusations take on a much harsher form in
the conversations where officials or company representatives are not present. Conver-
sations about the company and their operations were often fueled by open anger and
contempt for their actions:
“Would they get away with this in France? What if a Bunong development
company were to bulldoze a graveyard in Paris? Would they let us continue
if we paid a few hundred dollars? They will not even take on the expense of
our sacrifices! They have no respect for who we are and what we believe in,
they come here thinking they can do what they want, and in addition they
say they are here to help us? Their behavior is unacceptable!” Informant in
village 2.
In addition to the (frequent) outbursts against the company such as the two quoted
above, compensation and the distribution of compensation, like in the public transcript,
was much discussed between villagers. Not only in relation to the company, but also in
relation to the other villages of Bousraa. For instance, villagers of village four accused
villagers of village one of trying to “steal” their land by reporting it as theirs to claim com-
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pensation for it. When it comes to the compensation issued by the company, there was
talk about demanding more than the company could manage to pay in order to halt their
operations, for instance. One village chief said he was going to demand one elephant38
for each burial site that was desecrated, and, giggling, concluded that Socfin KCD would
never be able to get a hold of elephants. Furthermore, acts of sabotage were discussed in
these contexts, especially plans to go to the plantation and pull out newly sown rubber
saplings. This was something villagers were surprisingly open about, and as far as I could
tell it was a commonplace that it was done from time to time. The act was presented
as somewhat symbolic, and it was planned and agreed upon beforehand who and when
would undertake it. This is discussed in greater depth later in this chapter. Another
common theme of these discussions were accusations about corruption in the company
structure and in the local administration, especially authorities that were “on the side of
the company”, and the Khmer middlemen that were “stealing land”.
When it comes to the assessment of the hidden transcripts, one point becomes obvious:
the overlap between the public and hidden transcript is significant. With the exception
of specific sabotage actions, who does what and the planning of these actions, a lot of
discussion revolves around topics that the company has made an effort to discuss with
villagers, but with no degree of success. The public transcript as such fuels the hidden
transcript, which escalates the discussions to a level of more pronounced rage and frus-
tration, and again to the planning of direct actions against the company and its staff
and property. The public transcript thus acts as a form of frustration, not as a room of
negotiation and mutual will to compromise. Instead, it becomes an illustration of how
locked the situation has become, and how little room and willingness there is to make the
situation work in a way that is meaningful for both parties.
Having examined the public and hidden transcripts in Bousraa, a note should be made
of the flip side of this situation; my access to the hidden transcripts. There were a few
incidents during my fieldwork that indicate that I was, on occasion, efficiently blocked off
from the hidden transcripts of some informants, and even blocked off from the public tran-
38The Bunong have domesticated elephants for farming and forest work for centuries, a practice that
is now coming to an end due to the near-extinct status of the wild elephants in Cambodia.
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script on at least one occasion (the May 2010 meeting between Socfin KCD and villagers).
Following are three examples of disinformation and denial of access to information during
my fieldwork:
First there is the meeting I had with a village chief. As we had chatted for a while
about me and my project and whatnot, I mentioned the much-discussed riots that had
taken place a while back. This made him extremely uneasy, his eyes started drifting and
he shifted in his chair. He then proceeded to claim that none of the villagers in village
three were involved in the riots, as they had all agreed that the development was for the
greater good, and should be encouraged - something which didn’t add up with what other
informants had said. He also told me there would be a ceremony at the nearby waterfall,
where the entire village would participate, something which also didn’t check out. His
fellow villagers were also reluctant to talk, but some of them had no problems admitting
that they were present during the riots. I still do not understand what his worries were
all about, and I was unable to get a reasonable answer to this from any other source. I
crosschecked the information from the interview several times with other informants, and
concluded that the man had doctored almost everything he told me. He was unwilling to
speak to me again. Perhaps he had been involved in something similar before and had
been reprimanded, perhaps he was just protecting his own from a potential threat.
Secondly, there were several incidents with local authorities that took place mainly after
I moved permanently to Bousraa. The first morning in the house, I was awoken by a loud
banging on my door. The police were there, asking for my papers. As I only had an ID
card, and not my passport, I was “apprehended” and driven to Sen Monorom, where I had
to produce a passport with a valid visa. This was repeated three times over the course
of a month. In the end even the provincial police in Sen Monorom were embarrassed, as
they could not really produce a valid reason for forcing me to come to the station, but
they still managed to keep me from doing my work on several occasions. I would be in
the middle of an interview or a conversation, and some guy would sit down and start
staring. All of a sudden we are talking about the weather. I was invited to see the site of
the graveyard that had been bulldozed, but conveniently I have to meet some mid-level
police officer and explain my presence in the village. I never got a full explanation for
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why I had to do this, even after asking time and time again - perhaps I was being “kept
an eye on” in case I was instigating action against the plantation. In the end, I came to
accept police interference as a small annoyance, an annoyance that kept me from going to
the village meetings, of which there were several during my stay. The meetings have been
described to me in detail by informants, but sadly that must be considered second-rate
information in the village context.
Lastly, the example of my landlady should be mentioned, as she kept me from an im-
portant village meeting. During my final week in Bousraa, there was to be a collective
meeting between the company and villagers to discuss compensation for both a destroyed
graveyard and for the hectares of disputed land that had already been cleared. This
seemed to be my last chance of participating in one of the meetings. I met my landlady
before going for breakfast, and we agreed I would come back with my interpreter, and
that we would go to the meeting together. After coming back, she said we had to wait
a while, while she borrowed our motorcycle and went to a small farm of hers nearby, to
deliver the daily rations to some workers there. She took her time, and came back after
about an hour. She then told us to wait a bit longer, as the meeting wouldn’t begin for
a while. After waiting another hour I asked if we shouldn’t leave, to which she replied
that she now had a headache and would not be going after all. We asked her where the
meeting was, she told us O’Cher (the plantation offices outside the village), so we drove
out, to find the place deserted. A bit puzzled, we phoned her up, and she told us the
villagers had left for O’Cher, and would join us shortly. Surprisingly, they never showed
up. She told us she had spoken to them and knew they were coming. They didn’t come.
We later learned that the meeting had taken place on a different location. It was over
when we arrived. I had no reason not to trust my landlady before this event, but it would
seem she had been misinforming me when I asked for her advice on something. Sadly I
did not manage to see this until it became blatant. I do not know why she would do such
a thing. Perhaps she was afraid that having this nosy foreigner in her house could reflect
badly on her and her family.
What becomes clear from the above examples is that I was actively being lied to and
presented with disinformation on some occasions, and that I was actively being kept from
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participating in the interaction between villagers, authorities and company. There can
be many possible explanations for this, but I choose to see it as a sign of the tension
in Bousraa at the time of fieldwork, when the distrust in the community had grown sig-
nificantly due to the many incidents regarding the plantation. That being said, I was
fortunate enough to meet many informants who did not behave in this way, and as such
have enough data that is truthful to describe the situation accurately. Having dealt with
that, it’s time to move on to describing particular actions performed by the company to
fuel the moral indignation in the community.
4.2 Violations and Consequences
“So, they think they can come here and do what they want? I’ll go out there
and pull out the trees! If they put me in jail, fine! I will tell my children to do
the same, and they can arrest them too! They will have to treat us properly
if they want to stay here, they will have to listen!” Informant in village 1.
The aim of this section is to give examples of the actions performed by Socfin KCD that
served to infuriate the community to such an extent that they started planning sabotage
and even rose to a violent confrontation at one point. The section focuses on two main
topics: the restriction of access to forest and farmland, and the destruction of burial sites
and sacred forests.
The restriction of access to forest, as mentioned in chapter three, is the restriction of
access to an important social good in any Bunong society. This restriction started first
when company bulldozers started clearing the farmland of the inhabitants of Bousraa,
before the contract for the concession was even finalized (FIDH 2011). Escalating the
conflict, NGO and community representatives were restricted access to the areas in and
beyond the plantation (FIDH 2011, PPP 23.06 2009). The road that goes through the
plantation is considered a public road, and some inhabitants claimed to reporters that
their children was not able to attend school due to the restricted access enforced along
it (KPN 2009). By restricting access, and by detaching land form the community, the
plantation is effectively removing the means of production form the community, the very
same means that are the basis for the subsistence ethic. In addition, this also detaches
the inhabitants from many of their sacred sites, including their graveyards, which are an
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important part of their cosmology and their perceived welfare. This restriction, happen-
ing without the consent of villagers, without them being included in the decision-making
process on any level, and without proper mechanisms to prevent it from happening where
it shouldn’t, in addition to the fact that no compensation was given in a satisfactory,
systematic manner that included the villagers, is the main reason that the Bunong of
Bousraa violently oppose the plantation, and will go to extremes to stop its implementa-
tion. The acts of sabotage are also fueled by this, as they attempt to, in some small way,
stop the transformation of the landscape, or at least stall it. The fact that no function-
ing public transcript is in place to allow for meaningful dialogue, and no shared idea of
“development” exists between authorities, company and population, made the decision
to resort to these acts of resistance unavoidable.
Furthering, and indeed cementing, the distrust between company and population, is the
cases of grave desecration and the distortion of what Nikles (2006) calls “angry spirit
places”. As demonstrated in chapter two, the spirits are considered a force that has real
effect on villagers’ health and well-being, and as such should be respected and appeased
to protect the community from harm. With the bulldozing of graveyards, the spirits of
the ancestors are disturbed, and must be appeased, which involves ceremonies that are
costly in terms of livestock and wine for sacrifices. In addition, the spirits that live in the
“angry spirit places” are not to be tampered with in any way, as demonstrated in Nikles
(2006). No produce is to be harvested from these areas, no trees are to be felled, and
nothing is to be planted (Nikles 2006). Contrasting this to the “flattening” that is hap-
pening on the concession grounds in Bousraa, the community is put in another tight spot
if they want to ensure their own well-being. This leads to generating a need for many and
costly ceremonies, effectively driving people bankrupt if they want to be able to appease
the spirits in any significant way. Many informants reported that even if they had cere-
monies, it was not enough, as the spirits had been upset so dramatically that they didn’t
have enough animals and wine to comfort them. This, coupled with the fact that there is
no more land for farming, makes the economic situation of many inhabitants of Bousraa
one not of development, but of underdevelopment. Regarding this situation as the basis
on which the villagers choose to act, the idea of trying to get rid of the plantation gives
significant meaning in trying to explain why acts of resistance have become commonplace
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in Bousraa. The specific acts of resistance are described in the next section.
4.3 Sabotage, Curses, Slander and Revolt
The specific acts of resistance towards the rubber plantation in Bousraa are manifold. I
have chosen here to focus on four types of actions. First, there is the sabotage actions,
which normally take the form of going to the plantation area and pulling out rubber
plants. Secondly, there is the spiritual resistance that takes the shape of placing curses on
the company. Thirdly, the slandering of officials, staff and authorities are commonplace
when talking to villagers. The last part of this section deals with the violent outburst
in December of 2008, when 400 villagers rallied in protest and destroyed equipment and
rubber seedlings at the Socfin KCD headquarters outside Bousraa.
Acts of sabotage became a topic after having spent some time with a group of my main
informants. They described getting some people together, going out to parts of the rubber
plantation that are not very well-guarded, and pulling out rubber trees in the hope of
killing them, thus incurring loss and extra labor on the company. I was present during
the planning of several of these actions, but never participated in one39. There are a few
people in the villages that are more prone to setting these things into life than others,
often going from house to house to “recruit” people to join them. The actions were more
openly planned than I had imagined - several people reported having said no, even that
they were not agreeing with the approach, but had no problem with others doing it.
These activists then form small groups, do what they plan, and repeat after a while. An
interesting point to note is that the topic was often accompanied by smiles and giggles - a
sort of basking in the frustration of employees and authorities that would have to spend
time, money and effort on rectifying the destroyed rows of trees. Even if just a few trees
were pulled out (which was most often the case, villagers reported pulling 10-15 trees as
the most common number), the satisfaction seemed to be great. Having lost their own
forest to the destruction of the developer, it seems only fair that the destruction of the
re-shaped forest gives a feeling of revenge.
39Had I been caught and reported, I would not have been allowed to continue my studies in Bousraa,
as the authorities would have had a legitimate reason for throwing me out by pinning the actions on me.
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A mention should be made here of spiritual resistance as well. Specifically, villagers
from Bousraa held a ceremony on the 20th of July 2010, cursing the company for taking
their land, hoping that this would put a stop to their operations. The villagers offered
pigs and jars of wine for the spirits, hoping that they would make the company “vanish
like a dead pig”, according to the Phnom Penh Post (21.07 2010). This was not something
I discussed with villagers, as, indeed, nobody mentioned it (the reported ceremony took
place after I returned from fieldwork). It can perhaps be seen as the villagers seeking any
last resort to win things in their favor, having seen that sabotage is not sufficient to stop
a project of this magnitude, and having seen that there seems to be no genuine wish for
the villagers’ involvement in the matters concerning them.
When it comes to slander, it is very much the same actions that were described in the
section about the hidden transcript of Bousraa. Allegations against company leaders were
common, but also apologetic at times, as the villagers assumed that the foreigners did not
understand what the Khmer staff was doing. Still, specific members of the foreign staff
at Socfin KCD offices were being singled out for their appearance, their manner of speech
and their general behavior. Anything from comic remarks about big noses to more seri-
ous accusations of being rude and aggressive was common to hear when discussing foreign
staff with villagers. When it comes to the Khmer employees, the slander takes a different
tone - there is no excuse for the behavior of these individuals, according to villagers. They
are “corrupt”, “greedy”, “cheeky” and even “evil” or “out to destroy the Bunong”. The
villagers are convinced that the Khmers do not feel they should have anything, that they
do not deserve anything, and that they are not entitled to anything, and so the Khmers
treat them in an extremely derogatory manner, even when face-to-face. In addition, the
accusations of corruption seemed to have basis in specific examples of under-reporting,
uncovered by villagers that had taken their accusation to one of the foreigners working for
the company. While the foreigner had agreed to rectify this, nothing had been done when
fieldwork was finished, and so no positive outcome was to be seen. If anything, it worsened
relations. Local authorities are also the target of much slander. In addition to also being
accused of being corrupt, they are seen as the force that “lets” the company keep clearing
land, even if it is contested. This is interesting, as it shows that villagers are aware that
laws are being broken, but are powerless to change this as the authorities allegedly are
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“in the pocket of the company”. Furthermore, the general accusation against them is
that they are also out to destroy the Bunong, like the other Khmers, and that they are
effectively doing it by not intervening in a situation that the villagers feel need addressing.
When it comes to outright revolt, this is not something that has been symptomatic for
villagers’ actions against the company in Bousraa. It has, to my knowledge, only hap-
pened once, on the 20th of December of 2008. Villagers reported that they were so angry
about the company coming to Bousraa and “stealing their land” that they rallied at the
plantation offices, set fire to trucks and destroyed rubber saplings. Villagers say that sev-
eral hundred people were there, and that three tractors and many rubber seedlings were
completely destroyed. This is in concurrence with FIDH (2011)40. Villagers also told of
Khmer staff standing by watching, and reported that the staff encouraged them, saying
that if they kept at it, they would lose everything, something which further angered the
villagers. If we remember Scott, “the outright violent, “revolutionary” uprisings are rare,
and in general an expression of great desperation” (1985) - something which makes sense
in the case of Bousraa. The atmosphere of David pitted against Goliath comes to mind,
and villagers saw this as a desperate last resort to prevent what for them would consti-
tute, as we have seen, a disaster of significant proportions. Having failed to achieve much
by it, the acts of resistance have been reduced to the more commonplace sabotage and
slander described above. The aftermath of the incident saw the arrest of six community
representatives the following month, all of which were released the same day but told not
to talk to anyone, or they would be arrested and put in jail (CHRAC/HRVC/ADHOC
2009). The revolt, then, was successfully repressed, and served mainly to legitimize the
presence of armed guards around the plantation gates.
4.4 Resistance and the Bunong
Having seen how the development of the rubber plantation has led to a set of reactions
in the community, and having examined those actions in the context of the village, a few
points can be made. First of all, the resistance towards the project seems to be motivated
40“400 Bunong demonstrate and destroy 43 rubber seedlings, burn three earth excavators and damage
a fourth. Socfin KCD then declines to intervene and refers the matter to the Government.” (FIDH 2011)
86
not only by the massive injustice done to the communities41 but also by the malfunction-
ing of any form of meaningful public transcript. The communication has been a source of
gradually escalating mistrust, up to the point where it is difficult to find any meaningful
form of communication likely. As shown above, the revolt was part of the beginning of
the situation - an outburst of sorts. After the revolt was suppressed, the resistance took
on more subtle and nuanced forms. What we can conclude from this is that villagers saw
early on what was going to happen, in concurrence with what was stated above. They
foresaw the disaster and attempted to stop it in its tracks, violently, before it got out
of hand, something which, had it happened, would have allowed for the meaningful in-
volvement of the villagers in the dialogue concerning the project, rather than them being
totally shut out from it, and villagers gradually losing trust in it. What the villagers
revolted against has now become a reality in Bousraa. The “moral bankruptcy” in rela-
tions to the desecration of “angry spirit places” and burial land, and, in continuation, the
bankruptcy of villagers as they try to rectify the situation with any means they have, all
the while having lost their farmlands, their subsistence basis and their flexibility. While
the resistance goes on, NGO involvement is on the rise, and the company keeps making
promises, it may now be a case of too little, too late. The majority of the population
will have to make do with the situation as it is, and make the switch from self-reliant
farmers to wage laborers. The acts of resistance in Bousraa are, collectively speaking, an
expression of the wish to not have had this happen. The project is at odds with any form
of idea the Bunong might have about their “development”, and is, as such, a failure for
all but those that gain on it, that is Khmer migrant workers, foreign shareholders, and
the Bunong that manage to get more high-ranking jobs in the community management
section of the project.
The triangularity of the case thus materializes: as the notions of right and wrong in
the community that are based on the subsistence ethic become clear by examining the
moral economy of the Bunong, we see that a development project that is not in any
way rooted in these notions will be resisted by any means available, even if resistance,
ultimately, is futile - at least in this case.
41This is perhaps a bombastic statement, but it is in accordance with what all other reports on the
specific case conclude.
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Figure 10: People gathering at a ceremony in Village 4.
Figure 11: The road through ”Varanasi”. Rubber saplings to the right.
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5 Conclusions
Before moving on to some concluding thoughts regarding moral economy, development
and resistance, as well as presenting some thoughts relating to Scott’s work, a brief recap
of the main points so far is in order.
The chapter on moral economy showed that by way of their relationship to land, the
Bunong’s sense of economy is based largely on morality, not profit. The main idea is that
due to the existence of a subsistence claim, their exchange of labor, their redistribution
mechanics etc., they can not be incorporated into a strictly profit-based economy based
on commodity production and wage labor, as this would unsettle the internal mechanisms
in the community.
The economic development project “Varanasi” implemented in Bousraa has affected this
relationship between the Bunong and their land dramatically. Thousands of hectares of
farmland has been cleared, land that the Bunong have been using for generations, and
the process for compensating them for this loss has been riddled with irregularities. What
is established in the chapter on development is that the concept “development” carries
different sets of meanings, depending on who uses it. The villagers can’t see how cutting
down their forest and taking the access to their land away can be development, while
Socfin KCD and the government argue that this is a necessity for the Bunong to “get
out of poverty”, and that the process is “inevitable”. The process is one of attempting
to incorporate a population whose sense of economy rests mainly within the realm of
morality, not of profit, and as such the project is not perceived as meaningful in any way
to its subjects.
As the chapter on resistance shows, the Bunong are resisting the implementation of the
rubber plantation on their lands with what means they have. Through sabotage, curses,
slander and revolt, they attempt to regain what little footing they can. The distrust be-
tween villagers and company has gone from bad to worse due to the continuous violations
of the company - the bulldozing of graveyard sites, clearing of trees from “angry spirit
places” and so on. This resistance can be seen as grounded in their moral economy - their
shared perceptions on such concepts as land, value, work and nature. The establishment
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of the plantation is in stark contrast to these perceptions, as it is forcing them into a
material economy, where production for the market, not consumption, is the norm and
goal.
5.1 In Conclusion: Moral Economy, Development and Resis-
tance
Some concluding notes should be made on the choice of using the moral economy concept
as analytical tool in regards to the situation in Bousraa. First of all, by investigating the
Bunong’s production, distribution and relationship to their land, their subsistence ethic
can be shown. This provides the basis for the contrasting analysis between a system of
production and distribution geared towards subsistence security, and that of the market;
a system that relies on the mechanics of supply and demand, wage labor and the distinc-
tion between producer and consumer. Furthermore, connecting these points to the idea of
land as a social good in Bunong society, a social good in which much of Bunong culture is
grounded, additional differences emerge: land has value both as and beyond that of being
the object of production for the Bunong, or the means of production for Socfin KCD.
Having established that the two systems are vastly different, especially in their handling
of inequality and insecurity, the moral economy of the Bunong can be discussed. What
can be argued, then, is that as contrast to the material, monetarized idea of economics
inherent in both development discourse and market economy, the moral economy offers a
way to see the economy not as driven only by monetary value, but as being part of a larger
cultural system, where not everything can be treated with money as a mediating factor.
The focus on security rather than profit, for instance, and also the distribution mechanics
and subsistence ethic, shows the economy as based primarily in morality, not in material
value. These moral values are inherent in the Bunong’s perception of land and resource
management - and so: material economics are not sufficient as explanatory models for
how the Bunong of Bousraa have reacted to their land being transformed from forests
and miirs into a monoculture - these economics would cement the Bunong as a backward
group that do not know or understand their own good. Moral economy, however, has
provided a more nuanced way of considering their reactions as sensible and reasonable
responses to unwanted change - change that is unwanted because it is not for the greater
good of the community.
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When it comes to the moral economy, a note should be made about complexity and
totality. While Scott’s argument was expanded upon here by way of Arnold (2001) and
the idea of social goods, there is in this example a basis for further elaborating the theory.
The Bunong have had market relations for some time, something which is not accounted
for in Scott (1976), while Arnold (2001) is based on communities in America, safely sit-
uated in the heart of capitalism. The case of Bousraa is situated somewhere between
these examples: there is a small degree of market interaction, and has been for some
time, which has not resulted in notable moral outrage. This has happened, however,
when a large-scale, forceful attempt is being made to incorporate the Bunong more fully
into the market as wage laborers. The idea, then, is that while the approach of social
goods can be applied here, and the market incorporation outrage of Scott can be ap-
plied as well, the most fruitful application of the concept is when it defines a “total”
- in this case relationship to land. The relationship to land, in the case of the Bunong,
permeate their culture completely: from agriculture and production to spirituality and re-
distribution, from subsistence ethic to moral economy. This totality is what structures the
moral economy in the case of the Bunong: it is, if you will, the moral equivalent of money.
In the case of Bousraa, we see that development and the agenda behind it is solidly
grounded in the idea of development as connected to material monetary economics. The
idea is to turn the “unproductive” (from the market economy perspective) forests of
Mondulkiri (even the wildlife sanctuaries) into profitable monocultures that produce for
external markets. This production, and the methods and power relations inherent in it,
starkly contrasts those of the Bunong - from self-subsistence to wage labor, from crop
diversification to monoculture, from redistribution mechanics to monetary economy - the
incompatibilities and misunderstandings are rife. The contrast becomes most obvious
when considering values. The Bunong have a “total” relationship to land, a relationship
that is complex and multilayered, that is the basis for their moral economy. As such
it holds a value that is not measurable in material terms - and not in a material econ-
omy, as the application of the moral economy concept to their culture has shown. The
transformation of the forest into monoculture represents the transition from this morally
grounded value into a value that is purely economical in the material sense: monetarized
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profit potential.
Development, then, loses it’s meaning when being applied to an already existing economy
that is based largely on morals, not markets. If development is seen as part of the Cam-
bodian state-formation project of “domesticating the margins”, we see that these projects
are not aimed at generating opportunities for the underprivileged, but for disciplining and
assimilating an unruly and remote part of the demography. The result of this develop-
ment project can be seen in the case at hand: the original population of an entire set of
villages are alienated from their lands, their subsistence security, their decision-making
capabilities and, by proxy, from their own culture that is deeply rooted in these things.
As shown, the estimated results in Bousraa of large-scale economic development is the
assimilation of a culture of self-subsistence and self-governance into the power relations of
state and subject, of employer and employee, of producer and consumer. As the Bunong
are not (yet) complying to the demands put on them by these new structures, it becomes
plausible to estimate that the project will turn the Bunong of Bousraa into a new sub-
class in their own villages. Migration of lowland Khmers may very well result in the
Bunong being excluded from the plantation more or less altogether, as the Khmers do not
have the same “disciplining issues” as the Bunong, and are willing to work on the terms
set up by the company. The restructuring of Bousraa into a set of villages dominated
by economic developers and Khmer workers, with the Bunong as the ultimate “losers”
makes a strong case for the rethinking of what “development” really is and should be - as
the villagers themselves express, there must be another way. Indeed, in this case, no de-
velopment at all would have been perceived as much preferable to what is happening now.
The fact that the grave desecration, the clearing of “angry spirit places”, the compensa-
tion process and the dialogue regarding the project have all been carried out and decided
upon without consulting the Bunong, have also fueled the resistance to the project. “De-
velopment”, then, becomes not only the generation of difference in the community, but
also the generation of resistance to the project itself. Through the strategies employed
by the villagers for halting, slowing or disrupting the implementation, it becomes obvious
once again that “development” is not achieving what the implementers allegedly want.
Instead of opportunity and economic progress, villagers find themselves spending time and
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resources on actively fighting the project. These actions, and the attitudes of the villagers
towards proposed and actual change can be used as a basis for rethinking development.
Finally, it seems appropriate to mention that the responsibility for a new and more
constructive approach to this kind of conflict must rest on the companies and on the
Cambodian government. A sort of circular argument seems to be inherent in the system
in its current representation: the company claims ignorance of the land being used as
farmland, referring to a concession granted by the government, and proceeds with imple-
mentation. The government, when protests or resistance surfaces, blames the company
for not respecting local villagers and customs. In a reality where, as has been shown,
models based on “North-Atlantic capitalism” (in Scott’s words) are being transferred to
the south, and even to the margins of the south, the responsibility must be on those that
infer their models on others to make the process meaningful, not the other way around.
5.2 In Conclusion: Thoughts on Evasion, Inclusion and State
Formation
A concluding note should be made here on the topic of state formation and evasion. James
Scott (2009) argues that the upland peoples of Southeast-Asia have willfully evaded state
formation and taxation through history, in part by their way of agriculture. A note should
be made here on this idea. Scott (2009) also concludes that this era is coming to an end
as states are furthering their grasp from their power centers - just what is happening in
Bousraa, by way of a development project. This will to evasion, and the communities
(Bousraa included) that have been evading the final incorporation into state-encouraged
market economies, are indeed disappearing. However, in light of “development projects”
such as the one undertaken in Bousraa, there is now a will to inclusion in the state-
formation - not a will to further attempt to evade it. The reason for this can be argued to
be the wish to preserve the relationship to land upon which the moral economy of these
communities is based. The wish is for the state to be able to stop this process of assimi-
lation. This is telling of how the Bunong inscribe meaning into the term “development”:
the government must be able to see that what is going on is wrong. As the era of evasion
is coming to an end, the need for fundamental rights when included in the state become
apparent: while capitalist, profit-oriented commodity production is not going to go away
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anytime soon, the populations that are forcibly being driven into this mode of production
wish for the state to enable them to preserve their land, and, by proxy, their culture.
This would concur with the ideas of Escobar (1992), in his discussion of the discourse of
anti-development: the “regeneration of people’s spaces”.
The tragic realities seem to insinuate that the outcome will be different, though: the
state and its extension to the more remote areas of Cambodia has been a driving force in
“developing” the Bunong. The project seems to be one of assimilation, disciplining and
incorporation, which, ultimately, leads to alienation.
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